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This Article starts from the important contributions of the
neurodiversity movement, which emphasizes the benefits of an expanded
view of protecting human difference. These differences include variations
in brain structure, behavior, and social functioning. Social impairments
are a potentialfeature of many disabilities covered under the employment
antidiscriminationprovisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), but the legal literature has not yet focused on the analytic
issues social impairments present. This Article analyzes how the ADA's
employment protections should apply in the social impairments context.
Congress's enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments ("ADAAA") in 2008 made important statutory changes that
render obsolete the pre-2008 case law on social impairments. Some courts
and commentators have yet to appreciatethis, however, so this Article first
addresses threshold coverage issues for social impairments, establishing
that social impairments qualify for ADA coverage on the same, now more
generous, basis as all other impairments under the ADAAA.

* Copyright © 2017 Susan D. Carle. I owe great thanks my colleague Robert
Dinerstein for generously sharing his knowledge of disability law with me over many
years and also for his excellent comments on an early draft of this Article. I also
benefited from helpful comments and/or discussions with Joshua Carle-Friedman,
Robert Corrada, Angela Hall, Stacy Hickox, Michelle Travis, Noah Zatz, and many
others. I wish to thank the research assistants who have helped me on this Article
during its long period of gestation, including Dan Amodeo, Sam DePrimio, Sara Falk,
Tiffany Kelley, Danli Lan, Michael Scarantino, Scott Schaefer, Michaela Spero, and
Caitlin Whaley. I benefited from opportunities to present parts of this Article at the
Indiana Law School 2015 Labor and Employment Law Colloquium, the Michigan
State University School of Human Resources and Labor Relations, and the Colorado
Bar Association, as well as from conversations on the Employment Discrimination
listserv. All mistakes are my own.

1109

1110

[Vol. 50:1109

University of California, Davis

Second, this Article investigates how the ADA's reasonable
accommodations mandate should apply in social impairments cases.
Courts in ADA cases usually accept the need for physical modifications of
the workplace. They are less likely, however, to approve modifications in
the socially constructed aspects of that space, even though modifications in
the social landscape may be precisely what are necessary to accommodate
employees with social challenges. And even when the need for a wellaccepted type of accommodation applies equally to employees with
physical and social impairments, courts show more skepticism towards
employees in the latter group. Relying on extensive canvassing of reported
cases, this Article evaluates what accommodations courts are most and
least likely to approve and offers recommendations for how to cast
accommodations requests to increase the likelihood of employers and
courts accepting them.
Finally, this Article explores the promising yet underutilized potential
of the "regardedas" prong of Title I of the ADA, which protects employees
against discriminationbased on an employer regardingthem as having an
impairment. As the social construction model of disability explains,
impairments in the workplace may arise because of the attitudes of others
rather than because of any relevant limitation in an employee's job
functioning. In social impairments cases, it may be the social order in the
workplace, by shunning those perceived to behave differently, that creates
an impairment.
By prohibiting social impairment discrimination, the ADA has the
potential to lower barriers to employment for persons perceived to be
different in a wide range of ways. Exploring the analytic issues social
impairments raise shows why courts, lawyers, scholars, commentators,
and the public should care deeply about protecting employees from
discrimination on the basis of a wide variety of differences. Protecting
persons from social impairment discrimination advances societal
understandings of the benefits of neurodiversity broadly construed. Social
impairments thus pose a frontierfor theorizing about disability that opens
new insights about the meaning and reach of non-discriminationvalues.
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"The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our
own times."'
INTRODUCTION

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") bars
employers with fifteen or more employees from discriminating against
persons with covered disabilities. 2 Its stated goal is to ensure that
differences in abilities that are irrelevant or largely irrelevant to job
functioning do not bar persons from gaining economic self-sufficiency
through paid employment, nor society from benefiting from their
labor and talents.3 The ADA explicitly covers so-called "mental" (i.e.,
brain-based) disabilities on equal terms with so-called "physical"
ones,4 but, as a large literature documents, many deficits exist in
courts' handling of mental disability claims.5
Many factors account for these problems. One important one, which
has thus far received too little attention, is courts' difficulties in
analyzing situations in which an employee's social functioning
constitutes an important aspect of her impairment. To give a few
examples from cases this Article will discuss below: a supervisor's
face-to-face
makes
extended
episode
depressive
major
communications with her supervisees unbearable; 6 a grocery store
shelf stocker's Tourette's syndrome causes him to blurt out offensive
epithets; 7 a counselor with a traumatic brain injury loses the one1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2012) (providing the definition of covered
employer); id. § 12112(a) (2012) (providing the general rule against discrimination in
employment).
3 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411
(1994) (arguing that "differences" are often morally irrelevant and that such
irrelevancy is the key reason for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of particular
characteristics, including disabilities).
4 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual . . . " (emphasis added)).
5 See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric
Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 271 (2000) (summarizing evidence that the ADA fails to protect employees
with psychiatric disabilities); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA
Enforcement System Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REV. 94
(2006) (concluding on the basis of extensive empirical research that persons with
psychiatric disabilities are treated less favorably under the ADA).
6 Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003).
7 Ray v. Kroeger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
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hour-per-week job coach her employer previously provided, who
helps her avoid on-the-job volatility; 8 and a medical resident with
Asperger's syndrome has difficulty communicating with his patients.9
Although a large literature addresses mental or "psychosocial"
disability under the ADA generally,o almost none of it specifically
focuses on the social functioning aspects of the broad range of potential
social impairments the case law reflects.
A more recent literature rejects the term disability and introduces
instead the term "neurodiversity," defined as "an approach to learning
and disability which suggests that diverse neurological conditions
appear as a result of normal variations in the human genome."1 1 The
neurodiversity movement eschews the tendency of experts to
pathologize brain-based differences in human functioning.1 2 Courts
applying the ADA, however, require such expert diagnoses, so I will
use them as required, all the while appreciating the problem of
characterizing difference as "disorder." The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Psychiatric Disorders ("DSM") is a chief offender in this
regard but is viewed as a definitive reference.1 3 It describes
impairments in social functioning as a potential feature of a great
many "disorders" it identifies. Social impairments also feature in many
cognitive, intellectual, learning and even so-called physical

8 Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (D. Ariz.
2009).
9 Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 198 (6th Cir. 2010).
10 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15 (1993/1994); Stefan, supra note 5;
Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 Nw. U. L.

REV. 1351 (2008).

11 See Definitions for Neurodiversity, DEFINITIONS.NET, http://www.definitions.net/
definition/Neurodiversity (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) ("This term was coined in the
late 1990s as a challenge to prevailing views of neurological diversity as inherently
pathological, and it asserts that neurological differences should be recognized and
respected as a social category on a par with gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or
disability status. Examples of these differences can include attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum disorder, dyscalculia, dyslexia, dyspraxia,
Tourette's syndrome, and others."). The term neurodiversity is sometimes used in
discussing the autism spectrum but can also be used to discuss brain-based differences
more generally. See id. I use neurodiversity throughout this Article in the second,
broader sense. See THOMAS ARMSTRONG, THE POWER OF NEURODIVERSITY 8 (2011); DANA
LEE BAKER, THE POLITICS OF NEURODIVERSITY: WHY PUBLIC POLICY MATTERS 17 (2011)
(using a very similar definition).
12 See supra note 11.
13 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N., THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 271 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
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disabilities.14 It is thus important to confront the issues social
impairments raise under Title I of the ADA.
Social impairments can pose complex issues under the ADA because
social ability very often is relevant to successful job performance. This
fact can make ADA cases involving plaintiffs with social impairments
harder to analyze than cases involving disabilities that have no real
relevance to performance on a job, such as engineer who uses a
wheelchair for locomotion. This in part explains courts' awkward
grappling with how social impairments should be handled under the
ADA. The ADA specifically states that it covers both "physical" and
"mental" impairments, however, so it is no answer to say that social
impairments simply do not qualify for ADA protection, though courts
have sometimes done so, as discussed further below.1 5 Many persons
with social impairments can function successfully in many jobs, and
the ADA mandates that employers permit them to do so.
The relevance of some degree of ability to function socially is not
the only reason courts find social impairment cases difficult. Other
problems arise because of the stigma associated with social
impairment. Courts often do not understand social impairments or do
not see them as significant limitations on a person's life activities. One
circuit even held that plaintiffs with social impairments are not
entitled to the ADA's protections at all.16
Other problems in courts' handling of social impairments cases arise
at the reasonable accommodations stage. Courts are often loath to
grant accommodations for social functioning challenges. Logically,
persons with social impairments may need accommodations
addressing the interpersonallandscape of work, just as persons with
physical challenges may need accommodations in the workplace's
physical landscape. But courts often regard intervention into a
workplace's managerial or interpersonal features as going beyond the
scope of the relief they should offer.
Even when plaintiffs in social impairments cases ask for the same
accommodations as courts routinely grant in other disability cases,
courts often look askance at them. Temporary leave or shortened work
hours to recover from a heart attack, for example, may appear
eminently reasonable to a court, but the same temporary leave or
shortened hours to recover from depression may not. Social
14

See infra Part I.

15 See infra section II.A.2 (discussing Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d
12 (1st Cir. 1997)). As further explained in section II.A.2, Soileau is no longer good
law after passage of the ADAAA.
16 See Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15.
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impairment cases thus suffer from the parity problem that has been
documented in "mental" disability cases more generally, but even
more so, as this Article will show in depth below.17
This Article examines the fundamental questions that the analysis of
social impairments poses under Title I of the ADA. Part I discusses the
general issue of social impairments, and Part 11 takes on the threshold
issues of establishing ADA coverage.1 8 Part II first asks under what
circumstances employees with social impairments should be eligible
for the ADA protections. Important statutory changes abrogate much
of the case law on social impairments decided before Congress's
enactment in 2008 of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments ("ADAAA"). Although some courts and commentators
have yet to fully appreciate this, these changes render obsolete the pre2008 case law on social impairments that was highly problematic for
plaintiffs, as Part 11 explains.' 9
Part III then looks at the reasonable accommodations questions that
arise in social impairment cases that survive threshold issues of ADA
coverage. 20 Relying on extensive canvassing of reported social
impairments cases, Part III analyzes what accommodations courts are
most and least likely to require. Part III also offers suggestions for how
lawyers and other advocates might best cast accommodations requests
to increase the likelihood that an employer and/or court will accept
them. Case analysis shows that litigation often is a non-preferred
17 There is a large and growing literature on mental disability and the ADA, but
very little on the specific issue of social impairment. On the literature of mental
disability and employment generally, see Lizabeth A. Barclay & Karen S. Markel,
Ethical Fairness and Human Rights: The Treatment of Employees with Psychiatric
Disabilities, 85 J. Bus. ETHICS 333, 333 (2009) (synthesizing "previous research on
individuals with psychiatric disabilities drawn from rehabilitation, psychological,
managerial, legal, as well as related business ethics writings" and illustrating the
"dynamics of (un)ethical behavior in relation to the employment of such
individuals"); Judith A. Cook, Employment Barriers for Persons with Psychiatric
Disabilities: Update of a Report for the President's Commission, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS.
1391, 1395 (2006) (reporting that employers in surveys express more negative
attitudes about hiring workers with psychiatric disabilities than any other group);
Laura F. Rothstein, The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Performance and Conduct
Deficiencies of Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disability Discrimination
Laws, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 931, 957 (1997) (discussing the balance among the
interests of other employees, plaintiffs, and employers that must be struck in mental
disabilities cases). An excellent overview, which is now unfortunately out of date due
to the many changes in the law, is SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (2002).
18 See infra Parts I & II.
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part Ill.
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option for achieving reasonable accommodations; far better in many
cases is negotiating "in the shadow" 2 1 of the ADA's protections, by
using the interactive process the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ("EEOC's") ADA regulations require. 22
Finally, Part IV explores the potential usefulness of the too often
overlooked "regarded as" prong of Title I of the ADA. 23 As clarified in
the ADAAA, an employee relying on this prong of the ADA has no
entitlement to reasonable accommodations but also need not establish
that a perceived impairment substantially limits or is perceived as
substantially limiting a major life activity. Although few post-ADAAA
cases have used the "regarded as" prong of the ADA, Part IV argues
that this prong has the potential to expose the wrong of discrimination
based on employers acting adversely against employees with a social
impairment simply because they perceive them as odd or different.
I.

WHAT ARE SOCIAL IMPAIRMENTS?

The ADA states that it potentially covers all recognized disabilities,
both "physical" and "mental" (or brain-based) in their origins. 24 Social
impairments can arise from either physical or mental conditions, as
discussed further below, but most often arise from what many
disability advocates refer to as "psychosocial" disabilities. By this term,
experts explain, they intend to capture the concept that persons may
face barriers to full participation in life due to mental, emotional, and
social challenges. 25 It is important to emphasize, however, that
psychosocial disability and social impairment are not coterminous
concepts: a person may have a psychosocial disability without having
significant social impairments, instead primarily facing challenges in
cognitive and/or emotional realms, for example, and persons may have
social impairments as a result of physical conditions, such as
21 Cf. Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (examining how legal rules affect
parties' negotiations conduct).
22 The EEOC states that "[tlo determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.
This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and
potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2016).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012); infra Part IV.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
25 See Taking a Human Rights Approach to Psychosocial Disability, UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/Takingahumanrightsapproachtopsychosocialdisability.aspx.
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blindness, rather than psychosocial ones.26 There is, to be sure,
considerable overlap between persons with social impairments and
persons with psychosocial disabilities, because many psychosocial
disabilities do involve social impairments, and many persons with
social impairments do have diagnosed psychosocial disabilities. But
overlap is not equivalence, and this point bears clarifying at the outset
of the analysis.
A perusal of the DSM, currently in its fifth edition ("DSM-V"),
demonstrates the pressing need for attention to the analysis of social
impairments under the ADA. Social impairments are features of a
broad variety of DSM diagnoses. These include mental illnesses such
as clinical depression, bi-polar disorder, social anxiety or phobia,
posttraumatic stress disorder, schizophrenia, and borderline
personality disorder. The DSM-V describes clinical depression as
involving "symptoms [that] cause clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning." 27 It highlights the same symptoms for bipolar disorder.28
The DSM-V further states that "[in social anxiety disorder (social
phobia), the individual is fearful or anxious about or avoidant of social
interactions . . . ."29 The diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress
disorder similarly include "[fi eelings of detachment or estrangement
from others."30 Disorders on the schizophrenia spectrum show "a
pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits, including reduced
capacityfor close relationships;cognitive or perceptual distortions; and
eccentricities of behavior . . . ."31 Moreover, the DSM-V states,
borderline personality disorder is marked by "[a] pervasive pattern of
instability of interpersonalrelationships. . . ."32
Likewise, social impairments are salient features of many conditions
referred to as "cognitive" impairments. Autism spectrum diagnoses,
for example, involve "[persistent deficits in social communication and
26 See infra text accompanying note 33 (explaining that the common definition of

psychosocial impairments refers to impairments related to the mental, emotional, and
social aspects of life); see also infra note 39 (discussing social impairments that can
arise from lack of sight).
27 See DSM-V, supra note 13, at 168 (emphasis added).
28 See id. at 132-33 ("The symptoms of depression or the unpredictability caused
by frequent alternation between periods of depression and hypomania causes clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning." (emphasis added)).
29 Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
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social interaction across multiple contexts"; these syndromes include
Asperger's syndrome and PDD-NOS. 33 Tourette's syndrome is yet
another neurological diagnosis characterized by compulsive and
involuntary tics and/or utterances and may include involuntary
"uttering [of] socially inappropriatewords." 34
Intellectual disability, too, usually involves social skills impairment,
including limitations in "everyday social" skills and "social problem
solving."3 5 Persons with intellectual disability display limitations in
adaptive behavior that include "[slocial skills," such as "interpersonal
skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naivete (i.e.,
wariness), social problem solving, and the ability to follow rules/obey
laws and to avoid being victimized." 36 And some brain-based
conditions that are typically classified as learning disabilities can have
important effects on social functioning, such as ADHD and some
speech impediments.3 7
33

Id. at 50, 53. The DSM-V notes that these social impairments can include:
1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from
abnormal social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation;
to reduced sharing of interests, emotions, or affect; to failure to initiate or
respond to social interactions.
2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction,
ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and nonverbal
communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language or
deficits in understanding and use of gestures; to a total lack of facial
expressions and nonverbal communication.
3. Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understandingrelationships, ranging,
for example, from difficulties adjusting behavior to suit various social
contexts; to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making friends; to
absence of interest in peers.

&

Id. (emphasis added).
34 See Tourette Syndrome Fact Sheet, NAT'L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE
(emphasis added), http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tourette/detail tourette.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2016).
35 See Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS'N ON INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ("AAIDD") (emphasis added), http://aaidd.org/intellectualdisability/definition#.VnMktJo07vo (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). The AAIDD defines an
intellectual disability as "a disability characterized by significant limitations in both
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many everyday social and
practicalskills. This disability originates before the age of 18." Id. (emphasis added).
36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 See, e.g., Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc., No. Civ.03-3294 DWF/SRN, 2004 WL
2931346, at *3, *5-6 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2004) (denying summary judgment to an
employer who argued that a plaintiffs severe speech impairment did not substantially
limit her ability to interact with others).
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Moreover, as already noted, not all social impairments fall in the
category of so-called mental or psychosocial disabilities. Impediments
classified as physical disabilities can give rise to social functioning
challenges as well. Traumatic brain injury is one example.38 Others
include visual or hearing impairments, which may make it more
difficult to respond to social and language cues others use. 39 Some
medical conditions, such as brain infection, cancer, liver and kidney
disease and diabetes, can cause social irritability or other significant
personality changes, as can certain medicines.4 0 In short, a wide range
of mental, cognitive, and physical conditions can give rise to social
impairments. In order to address precisely the topic that is the focus of
this Article, I use the specific, if somewhat awkward, term "social
impairment" to refer to disabilities of any kind that involve significant
impacts on social functioning.
Finally, of course, it bears emphasizing that not all persons who
have difficulties getting along with others have a potentially ADAqualified disability based on social impairment. Individuals may have
any number of personality traits that make social relations difficult:
they may be blunt, irascible, or cantankerous, lack good judgment, or
be either highly extraverted or extremely shy or reserved, all without
having recognized disabilities. As courts are fond of noting, the mere
fact of personality characteristics that make social relations difficult
does not make a disability; instead, a recognized impairing condition
must be involved. 4' Thus, the fear that applying the ADA to persons
with social impairments will lead to a cascade of cases seeking
38 See generally Portia L. Cole & Dale Margolin Cecka, Traumatic Brain Injury and
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Implications for the Social Work Profession, 59 Soc.
WORK 261 (2014) (discussing traumatic brain injury ("TBI") from a social worker's
perspective under the ADA). As Cole and Cecka note, between 2000 and 2012, an
estimated 266,810 U.S. military service members sustained TBIs. Id. at 262. Many
veterans seeking to return to work in civilian jobs may require ADA accommodations,
and the authors argue that social workers and others need to better understand the
law surrounding ADA accommodations and TBI as a result. See id. at 262-63, 267-68.
39 See, e.g., Developing Social Skills in Students Who Are Blind, PERKINS SCH. FOR THE
BLIND (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.perkins.org/stories/blog/developing-social-skills-instudents-who-are-blind (describing the many challenges students face in social
interactions when they cannot rely on visual cues).
40 See generally PROFESSIONAL GUIDE TO DISEASES (9th ed. 2009).
41 See, e.g., McAlindin v. Cty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Recognizing interacting with others as a major life activity of course does not mean
that any cantankerous person will be deemed substantially limited in a major life
activity."); Bennett v. Unisys Corp., No. 2:99CV0446, 2000 WL 33126583, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 11, 2000) ("The fact that a person is blunt in his or her interpersonal dealings
and has poor judgment does not give them a cause of action under the ADA.").
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accommodations at work is largely unwarranted; except in "regarded
as cases," the ADA's difficult threshold requirements should sift out
claims lacking a diagnosed condition that causes a significant
impairment, as will be discussed further in Part II below.42
11.

APPLYING THE ADA IN SOCIAL IMPAIRMENT CASES

In the ADA's relatively short existence, many issues about how its
provisions apply to social impairments remain unresolved. In the
ADAAA, Congress abrogated some key restrictive interpretations of
the ADA that the U.S. Supreme Court had offered prior to that time. 43
Some of these changes crucially affect the analysis of social
impairments under the ADA, as analyzed in detail below. Courts
sometimes fail to appreciate the extent to which the ADAAA abrogates
pre-2008 precedents, and this continuing confusion adds more
complexity to the analysis of social impairments under the ADA today.
The statute's structure and basic requirements provide a starting point.
A.

The Structure of the ADA

Title I of the ADA protects individuals with disabilities from
discrimination in employment in three ways, each defined in its §
12102(1) "Definitions" section. Section 12102(1)(A) provides ADA
coverage to persons with an "impairment" that "substantially limits
one or more major life activities[.]"44 Employers must grant
reasonable accommodations to such persons, provided that they can
perform the essential functions of the job at issue, either with or
without reasonable accommodations. 45 Section 12102(1)(B) covers
employees with "a record of such an impairment" in much the same
way. 46 Section 12102(1)(C) provides that an employer may not
discriminate in employment against an individual who is "regarded as"
having an impairment;47 under this "third prong" of the ADA,
See infra Part II.
3 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553,

42

3553-54 (stating that Congress's purpose was to reject several
interpretations of the Act).
4
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
45
46

narrow Court

See id. § 12111(8) (2012).
Id. § 12102(1)(B).

7 Id. § 12102(1)(C). The EEOC's regulations define impairments as follows:
(h) Physical or mental impairment means(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
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however, an employer is not required to make reasonable
accommodations and the individual is not required to prove that the
perceived impairment limits, or is regarded as limiting a major life
activity.48

Persons with social impairments may need to use any of these three
prongs of the ADA's protections depending on their needs and
particular situation. This Article will start with the threshold
requirements for making an ADA claim under prongs one and two,
then look at the reasonable accommodations provisions that apply to
these prongs, and finally explore the potential of the third "regarded
as" provision for those who experience discrimination but do not need
accommodations.
1.

Ability to Perform the Essential Functions of the Job

The ADA aims to start its analysis with a person rather than a
disability, and to ask a series of questions to determine whether that
person can raise a claim under Title I.49 In order to raise an
employment discrimination claim, a person must demonstrate that she
is "qualified" to perform the "essential functions" of the job in
question, with or without reasonable accommodations.5 0 Thus,
reasonable accommodations analysis can come up at the beginning of
any § 12102(1)(A) or (B) case, and also arises later in the analysis for
individuals who surmount these provisions' threshold requirements
and contest an employer's rejection of their request for
accommodations.51 Analysis at this later stage will be discussed in Part
III below.
anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability
(formerly termed "mental retardation"), organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2016).
48 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
49 See, e.g., id. § 12101 (2012) (referring throughout to "individuals" with
disabilities).
50 Id. § 12111(8) (2012) ("The term 'qualified individual' means an individual
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.").
51 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (2016) ("It is unlawful for a covered entity not to
make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
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A major issue for persons with significant social functioning
challenges can be whether they can perform the "essential functions"
of the job. This is a prerequisite under all three prongs of ADA
analysis.5 2 An "essential function" is one that is "fundamental" to a
position rather than "marginal," and involves "fact-sensitive
considerations and must be determined on a case-by-case basis."53
The essential functions issue can become salient in social
impairment cases because most jobs require at least some ability to
work with others. Thus, courts have sometimes held that ADA
plaintiffs with social impairments were not qualified for their jobs
because they lacked the particular social skills necessary to carry out
tasks the courts viewed as essential functions of the positions at issue.
In Cameron v. Community Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., for example,
the plaintiff began working for her employer as a part-time manager
and after a series of promotions became associate director. 54 She had
an anxiety disorder and got into a shouting match with an employee,
who resigned as a result.55 When Cameron returned from a two-week
leave, her employer fired her. 56 Cameron sued under the ADA but the
district court entered summary judgment against her.5 7 The Second
otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a disability, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business.").
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
53 Richardson v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2010)
(quoting Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002)). The
types of evidence used to determine essential functions of the job include:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2016).
54 Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir.

2003).

55 Id.
56

Id.

57 Id. at 61.
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Circuit affirmed, stating that "[s]ince Cameron's conceded inability to
get along with [others] drove away an employee whom she was
supposed to be supervising," she clearly "was unqualified to be a
supervisor."5

8

Another example is the Eleventh Circuit case, Taylor v. Food World,
Inc., where the plaintiff worked as a grocery clerk.59 He had Asperger's
syndrome, which caused him to speak loudly and ask personal
questions of customers. 60 After three customers complained to the
management, Taylor was terminated. 61 He sued under the ADA but the
district court entered summary judgment for the employer, finding
that interacting appropriately with customers was an "essential job
function."62

Courts have even rejected claims on this basis of individuals with
very little need to interact with others, such as another grocery store
clerk who filed suit in Ray v. Kroeger Co. 63 Ray had Tourette's
syndrome, which caused him to utter involuntary racial epithets that
were highly offensive to others. 64 Ray's employer initially granted Ray
accommodations by allowing him to work at night when few others
were present.65 A cleaning contractor who was in the store during the
night shift overheard Ray's verbal tics, however, and complained to
Ray's employer, who fired Ray as a result. 66 The court held - perhaps
incorrectly, I will suggest below - that non-offensive interaction with
others was an essential function of even Ray's low-contact job and
dismissed his case on summary judgment. 67
Of course, far from all plaintiffs with social impairments lose under
this "essential functions" threshold requirement of the ADA. Often
plaintiffs' social impairments do not prevent them from doing a job's
essential functions, even if some accommodations may be needed to
allow them job success. But these plaintiffs, too, may face difficulties

58

Id. at 64.

59

Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998).

60

Id.

61

Id.

Id. at 1423-24; see also Rosenquist v. Ottoway Newspapers, Inc., 90 F. App'x
564, 565 (2d Cir. 2004) (involving a newspaper reporter who had an aneurysm that
62

led to difficulty communicating and could not do an essential job function because of
his communications difficulties).
63

264 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (S.D. Ga. 2003).

64

Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1228-29.

65
66
67
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surviving the ADA threshold analysis for a number of other reasons, as
I will discuss below.
2.

Demonstrating "Substantial Impairment" in "Major Life
Activities"

Establishing one's ability to do the "essential functions" of a job is
only part of the challenge persons with social impairments may face
under the first two prongs of the ADA's Title I. Section 12102(1)(A) of
a plaintiff seeking reasonable
requires
the ADA further
accommodations to demonstrate a "physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities[.]"68
Alternatively, the person may show a "record of such impairment[.] "69
Thus, after the person's qualifications to perform the essential
functions of the job are established - after the question of whether
the disability is too impairing has been resolved - the question of
whether the person's disability is sufficiently impairing - whether it
"substantially impairs a major life activity" - arises. This is a major
area in which Congress abrogated the Court's earlier rulings when it
passed the 2008 amendments. In order to fully understand how the
ADAAA affects the analysis in social impairments cases, it is necessary
to understand how the courts handled claims that social impairments
substantially limited major life activities prior to the ADAAA.
a.

Interactingwith Others as a Major Life Activity Priorto the
ADAAA

No line of cases better demonstrates the courts' lack of
understanding of social impairments under the ADA than those that
considered plaintiffs' pre-ADAAA claims that they were substantially
limited in the major life activity of "interacting with others." In 1997,
the First Circuit ruled in Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., that
interacting with others is not a major life activity. 70 That case involved

an engineer with average to above average job performance ratings but
a history of occasional difficulty in getting along with his coworkers
and boss.71 His employer fired him from his job after a series of
escalating conflicts with his supervisors. 72 Soileau filed suit claiming

68 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
69 Id. § 12102(1)(B).
70 Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997).
71

Id. at 13.

72 Id. at 13-14.
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that he had been discriminated against on grounds of disability based
on diagnosed depression that interfered with his "ability to interact
with others." 73
Soileau argued that the ability to interact with others was a major
life activity, but the First Circuit disagreed, raising a number of
concerns. First, the court asserted that "the concept of 'ability to get
along with others' is remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to
make it unworkable as a definition."7 4 It acknowledged that "such an
ability is a skill to be prized," but viewed it as "different in kind from
breathing or walking, two exemplars which are used in the
regulations." 75 The court further worried that "whether a person has
such an ability may be a matter of subjective judgment; and the ability
may or may not exist depending on context." 76 The court then noted
that in the case before it, "Soileau's alleged inability to interact with
others came and went and was triggered by vicissitudes of life which
are normally stressful for ordinary people - losing a girlfriend or
being criticized by a supervisor" and that "Soileau's last depressive
episode was four years earlier, and he had no apparent difficulties in
the interim."7 7 The court concluded that "[tlo impose legally
enforceable duties on an employer based on such an amorphous
concept would be problematic."78

The Soileau court's reasoning is a classic illustration of the problems
persons with social impairments face in explaining the legitimacy of
their claims under the ADA in light of stigma, ignorance, and
misunderstanding. Different impairments do differ in their
manifestations, but this is no reason to deny coverage to some
impairments but not others. Many impairments may go into remission
and then flare up again, which is part of the reason § 12102(1)(B)
covers "a record of" a qualifying impairment. Most importantly, a
substantial limitation in the ability to interact with others most
definitely goes to a major life activity, indeed, one of the most
important abilities to life success, as research has shown. 79
73 Id.
7

at 13.
Id. at 15.

75 Id.
76 Id.

77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Studies show that persons with impairments in social functioning face great
&

challenges in all major spheres of life, including successful employment. See, e.g.,
Patricia Howlin et al., Adult Outcome for Children with Autism, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOL.
PSYCHIATRY 212, 224 (2004) (documenting through empirical study the major effects
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Soileau was the first court of appeals case to consider whether
interacting with others is a major life activity. The court's hesitation to
embrace the idea that ability to interact with others could be a major
life activity luckily did not catch on with other courts. Instead, all
subsequent courts have concluded that interacting with others is or
can be assumed to be a major life activity. Indeed, the EEOC's current
regulations expressly state that this is so.80
The more significant problem that emerged in many pre-ADAAA
cases was that courts began resolving claims of impairment in the
ability to interact with others unfavorably for plaintiffs by holding that
plaintiffs had failed to show that they were "substantially impaired" in
this ability. In a series of cases, courts rejected plaintiffs' claims that
they were substantially limited in the major life activity of interacting
with others, despite diagnoses of significant conditions such as major
depression, bipolar disorder, autism spectrum disorder and others,
now on the grounds that plaintiffs' impairments were not sufficiently
severe to qualify for ADA protection.
Ironically, the lead, highly restrictive, pre-ADAAA opinion on how
much social impairment qualifies as "substantial" became McAlindin v.
County of San Diego, a case in which the Ninth Circuit did allow a
claim of impairment in the ability to interact with others to proceed
beyond summary judgment.8 1 In doing so, however, the court held
that "a plaintiff must show that his 'relations with others were
characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for example,
consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to
communicate when necessary."' 82 The court in McAlindin held that the
record before it established a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether McAlindin had met this standard. 83 His medical evaluations
showed that his anxiety and panic disorders caused him to become
increasingly withdrawn and "his ability to deal with people and stress
was seriously diminished," so much so that he had no social activities
outside his family, was not involved in political or religious groups,
and even had a "total inability to communicate at times[.]"84 Thus, the
court concluded, the plaintiffs "alleged 'fear reaction' and

to adult life functioning of children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders).
80 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (2016) (including "interacting with others" as a
major life activity).
81 McAlindin v. Cty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1999).
82 Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
83 See id.
84 Id.
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'communicative paralysis' are sufficiently severe to raise a genuine
issue of material fact about his ability to interact with others." 8 5
Although McAlindin himself survived summary judgment, the high
degree of impairment the Ninth Circuit defined as necessary to show
"substantial limitation" led many other courts to deny plaintiffs' claims
in social impairment cases. 86 Even on strong facts, many pre-2008
courts denied plaintiffs' claims of impairments in interacting with
others, quoting McAlindin's language requiring virtually complete
inability to interact with others as necessary to establish a substantial
limitation. In other words, these courts held that the plaintiffs'
impairments in interacting with others had to be so "severe" as to
prevent them from interacting with others in virtually any context. 87
The use of this high McAlindin threshold for finding substantial
impairment in interacting with others presented a virtual bar for
plaintiffs with social impairments who could still do the essential
functions of the job. Employees who suffer from social problems so
severe that they manifest "consistently high levels of hostility,"
complete "social withdrawal" or "failure to communicate when
85
86

Id. at 1235-36.
See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2004)

(holding that a plaintiff is substantially limited in interacting with others only when
the impairment "severely limits the fundamental ability to communicate with others,"
but not when communication is "inappropriate, ineffective, or unsuccessful"); Steele
v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff with
obsessive compulsive disorder whose behaviors made him the frequent butt of nasty
workplace jokes did not meet McAlindin standard); Olson v. Dubuque Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 137 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a plaintiff with depression and
severe social withdrawal did not meet the McAlindin/EEOC standard); see also Bell v.
Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2005) (concluding that a plaintiff with
Tourette's syndrome who worked for the FBI as a photographer failed to meet the
"high" standard for impairment in interacting with others under Toyota). There was a
debate in law reviews on this issue, which the ADAAA now likewise supersedes. See,
e.g., Patrick A. Hartman, "Interacting with Others" as a Major Life Activity Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 139, 140 (2005) (arguing in
favor of ADA coverage for person with impairments in their ability to interact with
others); Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1139, 1142-43 (arguing that
interacting with others must be seen as a major life activity under the ADA); Matthew
M. Cannon, Comment, Mending a Monumental Mountain: Resolving Two CriticalCircuit
Splits Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for the Sake of Logic, Unity, and the
Mentally Disabled, 2006 BYU L. REV. 529, 543-47, 557-59 (arguing in favor of
interacting with others as a major life activity). But see Bryan P. Stephenson,
Comment, I'm So Lonesome I Could Cry .. . But Could I Sue?: Whether "Interactingwith
Others" Is a Major Life Activity Under the ADA, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 799-801 (2004)
(arguing that interacting with others is not a major life activity).
87 See supra note 86.
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necessary,"8 8 probably cannot meet the threshold requirement of being
able to "perform the essential functions" of virtually any job.
McAlindin, in short, threatened to write protection for persons with
social impairments out of the ADA.
A case example demonstrates this point. In Heisler v. Metropolitan
Council, an employee experiencing severe depression returned to work
after a hospitalization for suicidal thoughts.89 She asked for the
accommodation of being assigned to a day rather than a night shift,
which tended to exacerbate her symptoms. 90 Her employer fired her
instead.9 1 The Eighth Circuit held that Heisler was not substantially
impaired in her ability to relate to others despite her testimony that
she was isolating herself and not talking to or calling anyone. 92 In
support of this conclusion, the court pointed out that Heisler had
testified that she was still able to perform her job duties, which
required her to supervise other employees. 93 She had also stated that
she had a "support network" outside of work in a couple of good
friends, her brother, and a friend's mother. 94 On the basis of this
testimony, the court concluded on summary judgment that "Heisler
has failed to meet her burden of establishing that her depression
significantly restricted her ability to interact with others as compared
to the general population." 95
Note how Heisler illustrates a "Catch-22": employees with social
impairments may be either too significantly or not significantly
enough impaired to qualify for ADA coverage; they may find
themselves "damned if they do and damned if they don't." Prior to the
ADAAA, the likelihood that an employee with a social impairment
would be found both qualified to perform a job's essential functions,
yet also severely enough impaired to meet the substantial impairment
requirement was slim indeed.

88 McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235; id. at 1241 (Trott, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
89 Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id.
91 Id. at 625-26.
92 Id. at 629-30.
93 See id. at 629.
90

94 Id.
95 Id. (citing Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 496 (10th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting an ADA claim of substantial impairment in interacting with others where
the employee testified that she stopped visiting with friends but the employer
introduced evidence that she continued to interact normally at work)).
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Luckily, passage of the ADAAA changed this analysis, though not all
courts realize the extent of the changes the ADAAA made to the law. 96
After the ADAAA, no ADA plaintiff may be required to establish that
an impairment severely impairs the ability to carry out a major life
activity.97 The ADAAA also greatly expands the activities considered
"major life activities" for purposes of meeting the ADA's threshold
requirements. Both topics will be discussed below.
b.

Appreciating the ADAAA's Significance to Analysis of Substantial
Limitations in Major Life Activities

A key reform brought about by the ADAAA involves Congress's
rejection of the opinion ADA critic Justice O'Connor wrote for a Court
majority in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams.98 Williams held
that a disability must severely impair the most basic life activities of an
individual in order for that individual to qualify for ADA coverage.99
The plaintiff was a machinist who had developed carpal tunnel
syndrome as a result of using hand-held vibrating power tools in her
automobile assembly job.100 Justice O'Connor held that Williams did
not have a qualifying disability under the ADA because her ability to
use her hands, while greatly reduced, was not so severely impaired
that she could not, albeit with difficulty, carry out basic life activities
such as dressing, grooming, and tending house. 101 Williams testified
that her carpal tunnel syndrome prevented her from playing with her
grandchildren, gardening, or performing most types of work.1 02 But
because she could brush her teeth and shop and cook with difficulty,

96 One important empirical study documents a shockingly high incidence of
courts and litigants failing to even cite in case pleadings and judgments the very
significant modifications the ADAAA made in the statutory text and congressionally
stated purposes of the ADA. See Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, Pleading

DisabilityAfter the ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 3 (2013). Standard research
guides also fail to make note of these significant alterations in the law. See, e.g.,
Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, What Constitutes Substantial Limitation on
Major Life Activity of Interacting with Others for Purposes of Americans with Disabilities
Act, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 347 (2005) (failing entirely to acknowledge and revise
discussion in light of the important changes in ADA analysis the ADAAA makes in
social impairment cases).
97 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554.
98 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
99 Id. at 198.
100 Id. at 187.
101 Id. at 201-02.
102 Id. at 202.
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the Court held she was not so disabled as to meet the ADA's
requirement of substantial impairment in a major life activity.1 03
In the face of this holding, Congress expressly states in the ADAAA
that the Williams standard of "severe" impairment is an incorrect
interpretation of the Act. 104 Instead, all that is needed is a showing of a
substantial impairment, and this should be construed "in favor of
expansive coverage." 0 5 In other words, in forcefully rejecting Williams
in the text of the ADAAA, Congress disapproved the high threshold
for coverage defined in Williams, the EEOC's regulations at that time,
and cases like McAlindin.1 06 Congress instead wanted to ensure that
the focus in ADA cases would be on the employer's ability to
accommodate disabilities rather than on the extent of a plaintiffs
impairment.107 The ADAAA significantly improves the playing field for
See id.
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553,

103

104

3554.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2016).
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553,

105
106

3554.
107 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553,
3553-54. This Act states the following:

Congress finds that

-

(a) FINDINGS -

(5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the
broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA;
(6) as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have
incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of
substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities;
(7) in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002),
interpreted the term "substantially limits" to require a greater degree of
limitation than was intended by Congress; and
(8) Congress finds that the current Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ADA regulations defining the term "substantially limits" as
"significantly restricted" are inconsistent with congressional intent, by
expressing too high a standard.
The purposes of this Act are

-

(b) PURPOSES -

(4) to reject the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002),
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all ADA Title I plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not have to show that their
condition severely impairs their ability to interact with others as the
McAlindin court opined. Without question, McAlindin is no longer
good law.
Congress further stated in the ADAAA that, along with lowering the
standard for what degree of limitation is sufficient to show
impairment, it intended to expand what activities qualify as major life
activities under the ADA. 108 Thus, as the EEOC's regulations
promulgated under the ADAAA state, it "should easily be concluded"

that the terms "substantially" and "major" in the definition of disability
under the ADA "need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled," and that to be substantially limited
in performing a major life activity under the ADA "an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's
daily lives";
(5) to convey congressional intent that the standard created by the
Supreme Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially limits", and
applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, has created an
inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage
under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of Congress that the
primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be
whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their
obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual's
impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive
analysis; and
(6) to express Congress'
Opportunity Commission
regulations that defines the
restricted" to be consistent
made by this Act.

expectation that the Equal Employment
will revise that portion of its current
term "substantially limits" as "significantly
with this Act, including the amendments

Id.
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (2016). It states the following:
(4) Rules of construction regarding the definition of disability
The definition of "disability" in paragraph (1)
accordance with the following:

shall be construed in

(A) The definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.
(B) The term "substantially limits" shall be interpreted consistently
with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
Id.
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that impairments including intellectual disability, autism, and major
depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia may "substantially
limit .

.

. major life activities."1 09

In short, the ADAAA is of crucial importance in analyzing social
impairments. The ADAAA abrogates all prior cases that narrowly
interpreted when difficulties with social relations constitute a
qualifying impairment, broadening the definitions of both "substantial
limitations" and "major life activities."
Some post-ADAAA opinions correctly appreciate these changes in
the law but others do not. One case that gets the analysis right is
Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts." 0 This case, well
litigated by disability rights specialists from the Bazelon Center for
Mental Health, involved a plaintiff with a longstanding diagnosis of
social anxiety disorder.' 1 ' Jacobs started a job as an office assistant in a
court clerk's office and one month later received promotion to a
deputy clerk position.11 2 Four or five of the thirty employees in this
position interacted with customers at the front counter, while others
did a variety of other tasks including microfilming and filing.11 3 After
being assigned front-desk duty and finding that it caused her extreme
stress and panic attacks, Jacobs asked for an accommodation that
would allow her to work at the front desk less often.114 Her employer
instead fired her.11 5 After Jacobs filed suit, her employer argued that
she could not be substantially limited in interacting with others
because she did interact with others on a daily basis, socialized with
coworkers outside of work, and took part in Facebook.116
The Fourth Circuit roundly rejected this argument, however,
reasoning that "[a] person need not live as a hermit in order to be
109 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2016). The ADAAA also clearly abrogates a line of
cases that disqualified plaintiffs from coverage where their conditions substantially
improved with medication. See, e.g., Nave v. Woolridge Constr., No. CIV.A. 96-2891,
1997 WL 379174, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997) (rejecting as only temporary in
nature a plaintiffs disability claim where he had benefited from psychotherapy and
antidepressant medication and had remarkably improved). The ADAAA specifically
states that the extent of a plaintiffs impairment must be evaluated "without regard to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
110 780 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2015).
Mll Id. at 566.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 566-67.
115 Id. at 567.

116 Id. at 573.
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'substantially limited' in interacting with others." 117 The court cited
the DSM-IV to note that persons with social anxiety disorders may
either avoid social situations or endure them with intense anxiety. 118
Pointing to Jacobs's testimony that working at the front counter
caused her extreme stress and panic attacks, the court concluded that
her claim survived summary judgment.1 19 The facts that Jacobs spoke
to coworkers, performed her job at the front counter, and attended
several outings with coworkers were "hardly dispositive," according to
the court. 120 The Jacobs court thus correctly rejected the high bar of
virtually complete impairment in the major life activity of interacting
with others set by earlier, pre-ADAAA courts quoting McAlindin.
Other post-ADAAA federal district courts have reached similar
conclusions. 121
Some post-ADAAA courts, however, such as the Ninth Circuit, have
rejected plaintiffs' claims for lack of substantial impairment in
interacting with others, though these cases have distinguishable facts
and do not (at least yet) indicate a circuit split. 122 Jacobs should stand
as an important step forward in correctly applying the "substantial
limitation" standard to social impairments under the post-ADAAA
framework. Total or severe incapacity is not required.
In sum, Congress's clarifications in the ADAAA establish that
interacting with others is a major life activity

23

and that substantial

117 Id.
118 Id. at 573-74.

119 Id. at 566-67, 582.
120 Id. at 574.

121 See, e.g., Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(noting, in a case allowing an employee with autism to proceed to trial on a claim of
substantial impairment in the ability to interact with others, that "Ithe ADAAA,
which was enacted after Jacques1,] . . . drastically altered the manner in which the
phrases 'substantially limit' and 'major life activity' should be construed" with respect
to interacting with others).
122 See, e.g., Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 2014). In
Weaving, the plaintiff, a police officer, had ADHD and had "recurring interpersonal
problems with his colleagues[.I" He won his jury trial under the ADA but the court of
appeals reversed, concluding that the jury could not, as a matter of law, have found
that ADHD substantially limited his ability to interact with others within the meaning
of the ADA. Id. The court noted that Weaving was for the most part able to engage in
social interactions, including with his supervisors, but had problems only with his
peers and subordinates. Id. at 1113. The court cited McAlindin, which the ADAAA in
fact abrogates. See id. Insofar as Weaving's social disability was factually different from
Jacobs's, the two cases may be distinguished on their facts.
123 The definition of major life activities is as follows:
(1) In general. Major life activities include, but are not limited to:
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impairment in this area meets the ADA's threshold requirements. In
future cases in which these issues arise, plaintiffs' lawyers should
carefully brief and empirically support these points, drawing on
experts to document the substantial impairment in social functioning
caused by a diagnosed condition. If plaintiffs' advocates proceed in
this way, courts should have every reason to apply the ADAAA.
The ADAAA should also abrogate all pre-2008 court rulings that any
ability to maintain social relations disqualifies employees with social
impairments from ADA protection. A person who has no ability to
engage in social relations most likely lacks the ability to perform the
essential functions of almost any job, since almost all work involves
some interaction with others, if only to receive and respond to work
instructions. A person may have substantial difficulties with social
interactions because of a diagnosed condition, as did the plaintiff in
Heisler, who was experiencing major depression, yet still be capable of
maintaining some social ties and interactions at work. 124 Ironically, it
is the person potentially trapped in the ADA "Catch-22" - who is
somewhat impaired in social functioning but not so impaired as to be
unable to do the essential functions of the job - that the ADA aims to
identify and protect. To deny such individuals ADA coverage defeats
the ADA's very objective of opening the workplace to persons with
disabilities who can work if granted reasonable accommodations.
Yet despite the ADAAA, there is still a danger that persons with social
impairments will find themselves sandwiched between the requirements
of being both able to perform essential functions of a job, and
sufficiently impaired in one or more major life activities. They may, in
other words, still be trapped in a "Catch-22" of being either too
impaired or not impaired enough. To demonstrate this problem in the
context of social functioning at a job, consider Ray v. Kroger Co., the
case involving the grocery store shelf stocker with Tourette's syndrome,
which caused him to involuntarily utter racial epithets.1 25 The employer
allowed Ray to work the night shift and to show people a card to
explain the involuntary nature of his offensive verbal tics, but a cleaning
contractor in the store in the middle of the night heard the tics and

Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
interactingwith others, and working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
124 See Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003).
125 Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
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expressed offense, leading the employer to fire Ray. 126 In finding that
Ray's impairment prevented him from doing the "essential functions" of
his job, the court in essence found that Ray was too impaired in social
functioning to perform even a low-interaction job such as stocking
grocery store shelves at night. 127 In Heisler, on the other hand, the court
found that a plaintiff experiencing severe depression and difficulty
interacting with others at work, though able to continue in her job and
maintain a limited social support network through family and friends,
was not sufficiently impaired to receive ADA protection. 128 Lawyers
representing employees in social impairment cases must take careful
steps to avoid this "Catch-22" of being either too impaired or not
impaired enough, as discussed further below.
B.

Surviving the ADA Threshold Analysis in Social Impairment
Cases Today

After the ADAAA's enactment, the EEOC retracted its earlier
regulations that offered restrictive definitions of what constitutes a
"substantial" impairment. 129 In their place the EEOC's new regulations
emphasize the importance of interpreting the ADA broadly. This
mandate will be helpful in social impairment cases, but lawyers must
still present a strong factual record concerning the specifics of their
client's situation.
126
127
128
129

See id.
See id. at 1228.
See Heisler, 339 F.3d at 628-29.
These old regulations called on plaintiffs to show:
(i)

the nature and severity of the impairment;

(ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1991), amended by Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the American with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16978-01 (Mar. 25, 2011). Prior to 2008, courts used these factors to reject
plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., No. Civ. 02-73-PH,
2003 WL 169751, at *7-9 (D. Me. Jan. 24, 2003) (rejecting claim despite mental
health care providers' testimony that plaintiffs depression and anxiety substantially
limited his ability to interact with others because there was no evidence that his
disorder, although it had resulted in the plaintiff being taken from work in an
ambulance, was expected to have a long term impact). They should no longer do so,
but it behooves plaintiffs' lawyers to make their strongest case on all these factors
nevertheless, given courts' tendency toward discounting psychosocial disability
claims.

2017]1

Analyzing Social Impairments

1137

For example, pre-ADAAA courts frequently concluded that a
showing that a plaintiff had conflicts with her supervisors or coworkers failed to establish substantial impairment in ability to interact
with others because this showing did not establish that the plaintiff
30
had a substantial impairment in social functioning more generally.1
These precedents arguably do not survive the ADAAA, as the Jacobs
court in essence concluded.131 Other circuits may reach different
results, however, so plaintiffs' lawyers should strive to build a record
in their client's cases that demonstrates impairment in social
functioning beyond a particular workplace situation.
Similarly, many a social impairment case has failed because a court
found the expert evidence too cursory, vague, conclusory, abstract, or
lacking in concrete detail.1 32 In this context as in all cases, plaintiffs'
lawyers should work with experts to ensure that expert reports
extensively explain the basis for the experts' conclusions in a manner

130 See, e.g., Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001)
(finding, in a case where coworkers of a plaintiff with OCD called him "dunce,"
"psycho" and worse, that plaintiff failed to show that he was impaired in interacting
with others because he had only shown difficulty getting along with coworkers);

Williams v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 18 Nat'l Disability L. Rep. 9 198, at 1047
(S.D.N.Y 2000) (holding that plaintiffs depression caused by difficulty in getting
along with her boss and crude and vulgar behavior in the workplace was not so severe
or long lasting as to substantially limit major life activities); Stauffer v. Bayer Corp.,
No. 3:96-CV-661RP, 1997 WL 588890, at *6, *10 (N.D. Ind. July 21, 1997) (holding
that plaintiff failed to show that her ability to interact with others was substantially
limited because the evidence did not show that she had difficulty interacting with
coworkers other than one coworker and her supervisor).
131 See supra notes 119-121.
132 See, e.g., Baerga v. Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 97 Civ.0230(DAB), 2003 WL
22251294, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) (finding that a doctor's clinical
assessment of his patient's depression was "vague" and did not indicate how the
effects of the plaintiffs impairment caused a pattern of severe phobic reactions, and
that the plaintiffs testimony on how his impairment affected his ability to interact
with others was "self-serving" and "uncorroborated"); Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., No. 99
C 50287, 2001 WL 640973, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2001) (finding that the affidavit of
a treating psychotherapist was "too conclusive and uninformative to be given any
weight" even where the plaintiff had been receiving treatment at a Veterans
Administration ("VA") Medical Center for more than 15 years for an anxiety disorder
with panic attacks and his psychotherapist submitted an affidavit based on her
observations of the plaintiff during two recent years and a review of his medical
records from the VA for the preceding years, but did not offer reasons for her
conclusions, and did not compare the plaintiffs abilities to those of the general
population); see also Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419, 470 (2011) (observing that
Congress failed to use the ADAAA to correct some appellate courts' unduly high
standards for expert evidence).
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courts will accept. This is one of many areas of "culture clash"
between the law and other professions: experts from other disciplines
can fail to realize that courts may not credit their conclusions based on
the authority of their expertise alone.
Courts too often discredit experts' reports on the grounds that they
offer information that is not phrased in the correct legal language.1 33
All elements necessary to make out the plaintiffs case of social
impairment giving rise to an ADA claim usually should be covered in
the expert's evaluation. Similarly, courts may insist that expert reports
recite very specific details and give extensive reasons or factual
support for each of their conclusions. These requirements can put
treating or diagnosing professionals in a bind, because they quite
understandably may seek to protect patient confidentiality to the
extent possible by not revealing too many details about a plaintiffs
situation to an employer or court. A review of cases shows that this
understandable impulse to guard patient confidentiality can lead
courts to disregard professionals' reports and conclusions, however.1 34
Plaintiffs' lawyers should thus consider ways to work with clients,
judges, and employers to protect client information while still
developing a robust record on the features of a client's social
impairment. Such client privacy protections can include offering
submissions under seal and putting in place protective orders designed
to safeguard patient confidential information. These methods should
promote experts' ability to support lawyers in presenting the strongest,
135
most complete, and detailed factual case possible.

133 See Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIVJFM-99-2637, 2000 WL 1481300, at *34, *6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000) (rejecting the case of a plaintiff with autism who
submitted her psychiatrist's testimony that her life had been "marked by 'virtually
complete social isolation"' and that she lacked and would always lack the skills to
enjoy relationships with others, because this doctor did not testify to knowledge of the
plaintiffs relationships with anyone but himself and a coworker testified that she had
a good working relationship with the plaintiff); see also Koshko v. Gen. Elec. Co., No.
01 C 5069, 2003 WL 1582285, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2003) (rejecting a doctor's
affidavit that stated that the plaintiff had serious emotional problems that impacted
major life activities including interacting with others, where the doctor stated that
these activities were "impacted" but not "substantially limited").
134 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 132-133.
135 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sheffield Fin. LLC, No. 1:06CV00889, 2007 WL 1726560, at
*17 (M.D.N.C. June 13, 2007) (noting that a plaintiffs medical records in a Title VII
national origin discrimination case were protected by a consent protective order and
that "[flederal courts have held that 'the privacy of any individual and the
confidentiality of the files may be protected by an appropriate protective order"'
(quoting Willis v Golden Rule Ins. Co., No. CIV-3-89-0189, 1991 WL 350038, at *3
(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 1991))); Doe v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 1534,
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Yet another problem experts can face arises from the "Catch-22" of
ADA analysis already discussed. A medical expert's report that is too
positive about a patient's ability to function in the workplace may fail
to demonstrate substantial impairment in major life activities. 136 On
the other hand, a report that emphasizes the extent of an employee's
impairments may end up being quoted as evidence that an employee
cannot perform a job's essential functions, even with reasonable
accommodations. Expert reports thus must walk a fine line between
clearly explaining the substantial nature of a plaintiffs social
impairment and making the case that the plaintiff can, with or without
reasonable accommodations, perform the essential functions of the
job. This is yet another reason why it is important to ensure that
experts understand the ADA's legal requirements.
Similar pointers emerge from a study of how courts have dealt with
reasonable accommodations claims for plaintiffs with social
the need for
impairments. The more clearly documented
accommodations to address social impairment challenges, the more
likely a court is to accept the claim. This, of course, is true in all ADA
cases. But in cases requesting accommodations for social impairments,
courts sometimes do not fully understand the need for reasonable
accommodations because these impairments remain less well
understood by judges and the public alike. Strong factual records with
powerful supporting evidence in the form of experts' reports and/or
testimony thus are particularly important. I discuss the many legal and
practical issues that arise in reasonable accommodations requests in
social impairments cases in Part III below.
III.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR SOCIAL IMPAIRMENTS

Once a plaintiff meets the threshold requirements for ADA coverage
under § 12102(1)(A) & (B), the question arises of what
accommodations are reasonable. Here too, social impairment cases

1538 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff had demonstrated disability through an
affidavit filed under seal). See generally Megan I. Brennan, Evidence, Social Psychology,
and Health Care: Scalpel Please: Cutting to the Heart of Medical Records Disputes in
Employment Law Cases, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 992 (2015) (suggesting approaches
for parties, practitioners, and courts to use in handling medically sensitive information
in employment cases generally).
136 See, e.g., Polderman v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462-63 (N.D.
Ohio 1999) (holding that plaintiffs mental health counselor's testimony that the
plaintiffs illness "was not very severe" did not support the claim that the plaintiff
flight attendant was sufficiently disabled by her depression to be substantially limited
in her ability to interact with passengers).
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face special difficulties. This Part analyzes the existing case law
addressing reasonable accommodations for social impairments and
makes recommendations for both lawyers and courts. Far too often,
courts balk at requests for reasonable accommodations in the social
impairments context because they sound different than the kinds of
requests made in physical impairments cases. This is so even though
the latter kinds of requests may often be far more expensive. This lack
of open-mindedness is short-sighted and counterproductive, as I hope
to convince below.
To begin this discussion, it is helpful to present a more concrete
picture of how reasonable accommodations can successfully be
deployed in social impairments cases. Here are two illustrative
scenarios, created as a composite of some of the reported cases
examined for this Article:
Scenario One: Cecilia Cedarbaum has worked for ten years as a
successful senior program manager at a business school. Her position
requires her to market her program through national and international
travel, speeches, and meetings with college professors and business
contacts. Although usually an extroverted person, Cecilia experiences a
depression that causes her to find interpersonal interaction extremely
draining, especially if it is constant or long in duration. A psychiatrist
prescribes a period of medical leave, followed by a reduced workload,
permission to work at home, and a ban on travel, which Cecilia finds
especially exhausting, for a period of one year. Cecilia hires an
employment lawyer to assist her in negotiating these accommodations.
Through the interactiveprocess the EEOC mandates in ADA cases, Cecilia
and her employer negotiate accommodations that grant Cecilia three
months of medical leave, paid for under the disability leave policy her
employer provides; a reduced workload; and permission to work at home
two days a week. At first her employer is unwilling to grant her request of
no travel, but a junior colleague eager for more travel agrees to assume
these duties for an interim period. Following a year of medical treatment
and these accommodations, Cecelia is able to assume all of her regular
duties. Her colleague who volunteered to cover her travel obligations is
recognized for her success when she is promoted to become a senior
manager of a different program at the university.
Scenario Two: Ralph Sachs, diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome, is
fascinated by marine biology and graduatedfrom college with a straightA
record in the sciences. He is hired at a marine researchfacility, where he
finds the work fascinatingbut experiences difficulty in interacting with his
colleagues, who are all much older than he is and do not share any
hobbies or other lifestyle interests with Ralph. After Ralph receives several
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negative work evaluations in the categories of "getting along with others"
and "working well as a team member," Ralph meets with an attorney, who
advises Ralph to request job accommodations and to visit a vocational
specialist. This specialist recommends job coaching for Ralph, and puts
Ralph in touch with a service funded by the county that provides
government-funded, once-a-week, on-site job coaching for persons on the
autism spectrum. Ralph's lawyer helps him successfully negotiate with his
employer for this accommodation, overcoming the employer's initial
resistance to permit an outsider to regularly come into the workplace.
Ralph's job coach works with him to learn the "rules" of appropriate
workplace interaction, including tips for making small talk, avoiding
sharing too much personal information, and remaining calm when
workplace problems arise. This job coach also makes suggestions to
Ralph's supervisors about ways to manage his occasional outbursts of
frustration and tendencies to be too blunt in offering critical observations
to others. After two years of job coaching Ralph is able to interact
appropriatelywith his peers and has even become well-liked by them, who
come to appreciate his humor and quirky insights. In year three of his
employment Ralph wins a special commendationfor a scientific discovery
in his field.
These examples illustrate the possibilities for both employee work
success and benefits for employers who grant reasonable
accommodations to allow employees with social impairments to
contribute to a workplace mission. The accommodations need not be
extensive, certainly no more extensive than accommodations granted
routinely in physical disability cases, but are just as crucial to the
employees' ability to succeed in their employment. Yet far too often,
employers and/or courts are not willing to look to this goal of longterm workplace success. They balk at the idea of accommodating
social impairments, for a range of reasons that can include
unconscious prejudice against those who are different in the viscerally
perceived area of skillful social functioning. This failure to follow the
ADA results in unnecessary waste of human talent and a narrowing of
appreciation for and exploitation of the broad range of human talents.
The missteps evident in the case law on reasonable accommodations
in social impairment cases can be overcome, however, through good
lawyering and further education of the judiciary. To that end, the Parts
below examine and critique the current case law on reasonable
accommodations for social impairments.
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Reasonable Accommodations and the ADA's Interactive Process

Before discussing litigated cases, it is worth noting that the best
accommodations usually are achieved without litigation. In other
words, the best outcomes arise when an employer agrees to an
employee's reasonable accommodations request. This is the result the
EEOC intends to encourage by requiring employers and employees to
engage in the interactive process to negotiate, with a "problem solving
mentality," win-win solutions that keep employees working and meet
employers' legitimate business needs.1 37 This is where good ADA
lawyering should start.
As already noted above, good lawyering requires obtaining
appropriate expert reports. In the same way that the phrasing of
reports is important at the threshold coverage stage, experts' careful
drafting of reports at the reasonable accommodations negotiations
stage is equally crucial. Medical and/or vocational experts cannot
simply prescribe appropriate accommodations and expect employers
- or, later, courts - to accept them. Instead, they must explain the
links between the employee's particular impairments and the
accommodations requested. 138
Employees trigger the ADA's interactive process by providing their
employers with notice that they believe they have a qualifying
disability and wish to request a discussion about receiving reasonable
accommodations.1 39 After this, employers must engage in a good faith
interactive process to understand what accommodations the employee
wants and to offer their own accommodations suggestions that are
reasonable and meet the relevant objectives.14o While employers need

137 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)(2016) (discussing the interactive process the
EEOC requires in ADA cases). The ADA is thus an example of what Susan Sturm has
helpfully referred to as "second generation" legal approaches to antidiscrimination
law, which seek to create legal incentives for private actors to resolve legal disputes
among themselves to avoid the need to bring litigation. See generally Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458 (2001).
138 In Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2010), for
example, a medical resident with Asperger's Syndrome who had difficulty
communicating with patients simply asked for "knowledge and understanding" from
his colleagues and argued that they would find his communications effective once
informed of his condition and its symptoms and triggers. The court was not
persuaded, however, noting that he had failed to explain how the accommodation he
proposed would improve his patient interactions. Id.
139 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2016).
140 See id.
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not grant employees their requested or preferred accommodations,
they must attempt in good faith to offer reasonable ones.1 41
Lawyers should strongly and comprehensively build the case for
reasonable accommodations for persons with social impairments,
starting as early as possible - ideally, before an individual's initial
request for ADA accommodations. It may be much easier to persuade
an employer to offer reasonable accommodations at this informal
negotiations stage than to litigate after an employer has denied
effective accommodations, thus signaling that it has decided to endure
the costs and risks of a lawsuit. But many individuals will not have
contacted lawyers at this early stage, and may not even know that they
may ask for accommodations or request that their employer engage in
the interactive process. Thus, an important aspect of improving the
ADA's functioning requires educating employees and employers about
how Title I of the ADA works.
Even when cases come to lawyers only after an employee has filed or
is poised to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC or relevant
state agency, lawyers should press for EEOC-sponsored mediation
with the employer. Obtaining reasonable accommodations for social
impairments most often involves education and sensitization of
employers rather than significant costs. It therefore may be possible to
achieve good results through mediation, before positions become rigid
in the litigation process.1 42 Litigation tends to produce mixed results,
at best, as discussed further below.
B.

Reasonable Accommodations Listed in the ADA's Text

In casting accommodations requests in the ADA's framework,
lawyers should start with the ADA's statutory language. The text of the
ADA authorizes many types of accommodations, including "making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible . . and usable";
"job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules";
"reassignment to a vacant position"; "acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, [and] appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies"; as well as "the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar

141 Gruber v. Entergy Corp., No. CIV.A. 96-1409, 1997 WL 149966, at *4 (E.D. La.
Mar. 24, 1997) (noting, in a case involving an employee with depression, that "an
employer is not obligated to always provide an employee with the best possible
accommodations or to accommodate the employee in the specific manner requested").
142 The Court has recently noted the importance of the EEOC's mediation or
"conciliation" process in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2015).
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accommodations . . . ."143 Many of these generally stated types of
accommodations have physical barriers to workplace access foremost
in mind, but there is no reason other barriers to workplace
participation of persons with impairments should not also be
included. The discussion below will use this statutorily specified list as
its preliminary framework, and then go on to discuss other potentially
appropriate accommodations as well.144
1.

"Making Existing Facilities Accessible" and Using "Equipment
and Devices"

The idea of "making existing facilities . . accessible"1 45 brings
physical disabilities to mind. But facilities are organized for nonimpaired workers not only in a physical sense; they are also organized
this way in a psychosocial sense.1 46 Workplaces make not only
physical but also social demands on employees, such as by
sandwiching them together, exposing them to high noise flow, and/or
offering no spaces for retreat to take a break from social demands and
the like.1 47 Many workplace facility design features may be modified at
a relatively low cost. A quiet room can be offered, or a wing of office
space can be provided for employees who need a lower stimulation
environment. Doors or sound barriers can be installed. As is often true
of design choices that accommodate employees with disabilities,
design modifications may lead to productivity gains throughout the
workplace. Even employees who are not covered by the ADA may

143

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B) (2012).

Statutory provisions, case law, and EEOC regulations establish that some
categories of accommodations may be inappropriate. These include those that impose
an "undue hardship." See id. § 12111(10) (discussing factors to be applied in carrying
out this analysis, including specific ones laid out in (10)(B)(i)-(iv)); id. § 12182(b)(3)
(2012) (stating that a "direct threat" exists when there is a "significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of polices,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services"); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(r) (2016) (defining direct threat). All of these general parameters are well
established by statutory text, case law, EEOC regulations, and a large literature and
thus will not be a focus here.
144

145

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) (2012).

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REv.
397, 428-29 (2000) (defining the "social model" as viewing disabilities as the product
of interactions between the physical environment - including societal barriers - and
the person with the disability).
146

147 See id. at 429.
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benefit from better designed facilities that help re-center thoughts and
emotions.1 48
Similarly, employees with social impairments may need alternative
communications technologies. They may benefit from handling some
communications without face-to-face, real time interactions. In many
situations, adapting communications methods to accommodate an
employee with a social impairment may be reasonable. 4 9 Employees
may take part in some face-to-face meetings but use online
communications for another portion of their interactions. Greater use
of email may allow employees to avoid the stimulation and anxiety
associated with a constant barrage of in-person interactions. Email
may allow employees to think longer about responses and to rethink
and reevaluate before sending messages. It may remove nonverbal
social cues from the communication, thus leveling the playing field
because in email no one benefits from such cues. Of course, in some
jobs the ability to communicate immediately and effectively in face-toface interactions with others may be an essential job function;
consider, for example, a fire chief or other emergency workforce
supervisor. The ADA teaches, however, that what may be an
unreasonable accommodation in one circumstance may be reasonable
in another.
technologies
may
communications
In short,
alternative
accommodate employees with social impairments without burdening
legitimate employer interests. Such technology accommodations
should not be controversial because they are low-cost modifications
that clearly fall under the statutory text calling on employers to make
existing facilities accessible and employ and modify equipment or
devices to accommodate employees with disabilities.15 0

148

Cf.

MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND

(1990) (noting that accommodations for persons with disabilities often
benefit a wide range of others as well). These insights are incorporated into concepts
of universal design. See What is Universal Design, AMERHART (Sept. 29, 2014),
(describing universal design
http://www.amerhart.con/what-is-universal-design/
movement as "designing products and spaces so that they can be used by the widest
range of people possible").
149 See, e.g., Bennett v. Unisys Corp., No. 2:99CV0446, 2000 WL 33126583 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 11, 2000) (citing EEOC 1998 guidelines stating that adjusting the structure
of supervision can be a reasonable accommodation); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, 1997 WL 34622315, *12-13 (1997) (noting as an example of
a reasonable accommodation a supervisor "communicating assignments, instructions,
or training by the medium that is most effective for a particular individual").
150 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
AMERICAN LAW
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Providing "Interpreters": Job Coaches, Counselors, and Trainers

The reference to "interpreters" in the ADA provision that spells out
examples of "reasonable accommodations" refers most obviously to
sign language interpreters, but employees can need "interpretive"
assistance in other ways as well. Employees with social impairments
may need help interpreting the social world just as employees with
hearing impairments may need help in interpreting speech.
Interpreters for the social world can be job coaches, counselors, job
mentors or, in some circumstances, informal "work buddies" who
agree to look out for a fellow worker. Most often and most effectively,
such accommodations involve approving, appointing, or recruiting
experts such as job coaches, retention specialists, counselors, trainers,
and the like.
One of the most effective potential interpreters for employees with
social impairments is a job coach. A growing vocational experts'
literature documents the benefits of job coaches, 151 and a handful of
ADA cases approve this accommodation as well. The Job
Accommodations Network ("JAN"), an U.S. Department of Laborsponsored online resource on possible accommodations for
disabilities, explains: "While job coaches can be helpful in assisting
individuals with a wide variety of disabilities, job coaches most
commonly work with individuals who have conditions such as autism,
learning disabilities, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and cognitive
impairments."1 52 Moreover, it adds, "[j]ob coaching is also one of the
most frequently used accommodations by people with psychiatric
disabilities."1 53 JAN further notes that these resources may often be
provided externally and without cost to the employer, through state
vocational rehabilitation agencies or similar resources.154 Granting an
accommodation involving a part-time and/or temporary job coach,
vocational counselor, or similar trainer need not be expensive or
obtrusive.1 55 The employee gets assistance in navigating the
interpersonal aspects of succeeding at her job and the employer gets a
better performing employee.

151

See, e.g., Daniel Tucker, Accommodations and Compliance Series: Job Coaching in

the Workplace, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK (June 12, 2013), http://askjan.org/
topics/jobcoaching.htm (describing what job coaches are and how they may be helpful
to navigate ADA requirements).

Id.
153 Id.
152

154

Id.

155

See id.
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JAN provides two specific examples of accommodations that address
social interaction impairments through job coaches.15 6 These are
worth quoting in full in order to illustrate concretely the difference a
job coach can make:
Situation [11: A food service worker with an anxiety disorder works in
the kitchen of a restaurant, helping with food preparation and cleaning.
She is able to perform all of her essentialfunctions, but she tends to talk to
her co-workers incessantly about her personal issues to the point that
other employees complain to management. A manager talks with the food
service worker about her conduct and explains that it is interfering with
work and making coworkers uncomfortable.
Solution: The employee is a client of a mental health agency and offers
to talk with her service coordinator about getting a job coach. The job
coach teaches the employee how to talk with coworkers about impersonal
topics (like the weather) and how to focus conversations on work tasks she
and coworkers are performing. The job coach then helps the employee
apply the new skills directly on the job and is able to fade out direct
involvement after a couple of months.
Situation [21: A veteran who recently returned to the workforce after
spending several years overseas has Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and a Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), which causes difficulty with
memory and mood regulation. He was recently hired as a customer service
representative. After disclosing his disability and requesting reasonable
accommodations, his employer provided him with a cubicle close to an
exit, with his back facing a wall. This helped to alleviate some of his
stress, but he still had difficulty with memory and emotional outbursts.
Solution: The employer obtained a job coach through the Department of
Veterans Affairs to assist the employee with adjusting to his new position.
The job coach worked with the employer and employee to develop a
customized form for taking notes from customers and a system for
organizing the employee's workspace. The job coach also suggested the
employee e-mail his supervisor when he has questions so he will have
responses in written form that he can refer to later if he forgets something.
Finally, the job coach helped the employee incorporatebreaks into his day
to walk and do breathing exercises to help reduce the likelihood of
emotional outbursts. After the job coach comes in twice a week for three
weeks, the employee is able to incorporate the job coach's suggestions into
his regular routine and perform his job duties without assistance.

156

Id.
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In short, job coaches are a well-studied accommodation found to
produce effective results.157 Preliminary indications as to whether
courts will accept job coaches as a reasonable accommodation are
positive as well. One example of a case approving this accommodation
is Menchaca v. Maricopa Community College District.15 8 There, a car
accident caused traumatic brain injury and PTSD to the plaintiff, a
counselor for college students.15 9 As a result, she experienced some
60 After the college
difficulty with volatility in interpersonal relations.o
that employed her discontinued the job coach it had been providing
for her and then failed to renew her employment contract, she sued
under the ADA.161

The court denied the college's motion for summary judgment
against Menchaca's claim that a job coach was a reasonable
accommodation, noting that she had been successful at her job while
the college was providing her with a job coach for one hour per
week.16 2 This coach had assisted her with goal setting, decision
making, and communications skills and had discussed her work
activities to help her identify and resolve problems.1 63 The court
further noted that the suggested accommodation of a one-hour-perweek job coach involved a relatively minimal burden that could allow
this employee to successfully perform her job.1 64
Another case approving a job coach as an ADA accommodation for
an employee with a social impairment is Glaser v. Gap Inc.1 65 The Gap
employed Glaser, who had autism, as a merchandise handler, but fired
him after he had an altercation with his supervisor.1 66 Glaser filed suit
under the ADA.1 67 The court rejected Gap's argument that Glaser was
not sufficiently impaired to be eligible for ADA protection and further
denied Gap's motion for summary judgment on whether it had a
responsibility to provide him with accommodations.168 When Gap first
hired Glaser, he had requested a job coach, or "retention specialist,"

157

See, e.g., id. (citing additional sources).

158 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1072 (D. Ariz. 2009).
159 Id. at 1065.

164

See id.
Id. at 1066-67.
Id. at 1071-72.
See id. at 1072.
See id. at 1072-73.

165

994 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

166

Id. at 570-72.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 575, 580.

160
161
162

163

167
168
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but Gap denied this request even though a state service agency would
have provided this resource for free. 169 The court rejected Gap's
argument that this accommodation was "unreasonable as a matter of
law," pointing out that it had not identified any "undue hardship" that
would have arisen from granting Glaser's accommodations request.170
Other cases approve extended training periods or additional training
as reasonable accommodations for plaintiffs with social impairments.' 7
In still other cases, courts have rejected plaintiffs' ADA claims after
noting that the employer had provided accommodations such as job
coaching in prior situations. Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., for
example, involved a medical resident with Asperger's syndrome who
was terminated because of his difficulties interacting with patients as
well as mistakes in diagnosing and treating them.1 72 The employer had
provided remediation coaching for other residents with similar
problems." 3 In Jakubowki's situation, the employer met with
Jakubowski and offered to help him obtain a different placement in a
pathology residency that did not require as much interpersonal
interaction." 4 The court pointed to the employer's prior good faith in
discussing and providing accommodations in upholding the employer's
decision that Jakubowski could not perform the essential functions of a
family practice residency." 5
In sum, courts may see accommodation requests for a'part-time job
coach, trainer, or counselor as reasonable and minimally burdensome.
Court may see employers who provide such accommodations as acting
in good faith. Whether this accommodation is reasonable in the
circumstances will of course depend on the particular situation,
including the nature of the position and the amount and type of
coaching required. Courts are more likely to endorse job coaching or
extra training as accommodations when employees ask for these
Id. at 577-78.
Id. at 580.
171 See, e.g., Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that
an employer's provision of a temporary extended training period was a reasonable
accommodation for an employee with anxiety and panic disorders); Kleiber v. Honda
of Am. Mfg., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 809, 822 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affd, 485 F.3d 862 (6th
Cir. 2007) (stating that the use of a temporary job coach to assist in training an
employee who had experienced a traumatic brain injury could be a reasonable
accommodation, but a full-time job coach providing more than training would not be
a reasonable accommodation).
172 Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 198-99 (6th Cir. 2010).
173 Id. at 199.
174 Id. at 198-99.
175 Id. at 203.
169

170
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services on a part-time and/or temporary basis rather than constantly
or permanently.17 6 Courts have held, for example, that it is not
reasonable to request that an employer hire a new employee to assist
an ADA-protected employee in actually performing the essential
functions of a job; instead, courts have viewed such a request as an
admission that the employee cannot perform those essential functions.
In Stebbins v. Reliable Heat & Air, LLC, for example, an employee with
Asperger's syndrome worked as a customer service representative.1 77
He asked that his employer provide another employee to explain his
situation to customers who became upset with him over the phone.1 78
The court rejected this proposal, finding that it would require the
second employee to continuously monitor the plaintiffs phone calls
and thus showed that the plaintiff was not qualified to perform the
essential functions of his job.179 Thus, requests for full-time help
help that involves doing essential functions of a job-will backfire.180
More limited requests for part-time or temporary coaching and/or
training to assist an employee in adapting to the social demands of a
particular workplace should, in many situations, be reasonable.
Using co-workers as informal "job buddies" for persons with social
impairments may be less reasonable. On the one hand, this possible
accommodation demonstrates that workplaces are not necessarily
isolating and individualistic; the very fact that most workplaces are
social and collaborative supports the idea that workers can and do
help each other in myriad ways. Indeed, social coaching is not far
removed from the wise counsel of workplace friends from which many
employees benefit during their careers. On the other hand, assigning
the responsibility to support a fellow employee's job success to a coworker arguably puts it in the wrong place, since it is the employer's
burden to provide accommodations, not that of fellow employees. Coworker or peer social coaching thus may not be an appropriate
accommodation in many situations. This accommodation may provide
too little help, lack the efficacy of using a trained professional, and
potentially cause co-worker resentment. But it is one that can at least
See supra note 171.
Stebbins v. Reliable Heat & Air, LLC, No. 10-3305-CV-S-RED, 2011 WL
4729816, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 2011), affd, 473 F. App'x 518 (8th Cir. 2012).
178 Id. at *3.
176
177

179

Id.

See E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 148 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Vande
Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)) (holding that it was
not a reasonable accommodation to require a small nonprofit to hire additional staff to
accommodate an employee).
180
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be considered in circumstances in which it would not be onerous and
has a realistic probability of producing a positive outcome.
3.

Leaves of Absences

A temporary leave of absence should also be a reasonable
accommodation under EEOC regulations and the statutory text.181
Courts sometimes, but not always, get this issue right.1 82 Courts often
reject requests for indefinite or long leaves.1 83 The case law is mixed
on courts' willingness to grant limited temporary leave in social
impairment cases; critical in these situations is evidence that the
plaintiff will be able to return within a definite time frame and then be
able to do the essential functions of the job. Employers and courts that

&

181 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2016); 29 C.F.R. pt. 32, app. A(b)
(stating that regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor indicate that a
reasonable accommodation may require an employer to grant liberal time off or leave
without pay when paid sick leave is exhausted and when the disability is of a nature
that it is likely to respond to treatment of hospitalization).
182 See, e.g., Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a leave of absence for medical treatment for obsessive-compulsive
disorder may be a reasonable accommodation); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437,
443-44 (1st Cir. 1998) (allowing a temporary leave of absence to an employee with
depression as a reasonable accommodation); Ralph v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 135 F.3d
166, 172 (1st Cir. 1998) (approving a four-week provisional part-time period of
employment as a reasonable accommodation for an employee with depression and
post-traumatic stress disorder); Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 6768 (2000) (noting that, although an employer is not required under the ADA to create
a temporary position for an employee with posttraumatic stress disorder, holding her
job open while she healed was a reasonable accommodation that "may be all that is
required where it appears likely that the employee will be able to return to an existing
position at some time in the foreseeable future"); see also Stacy A. Hickox & Joseph
M. Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation: When Is Enough, Enough?, 62 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 437, 483 (2014) (concluding on the basis of extensive empirical analysis that
employees with mental illness are less likely to succeed in challenging denial of leave
as an accommodation and also that short, definitive leave requests are more likely to
succeed).
183 See, e.g., Allen v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 483 F. App'x 197, 201 (6th Cir.
2012) (stating that it was not a reasonable accommodation to request indefinite leave
under an employer's disability plan); Moore v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 2d 955, 965-66 (D. Ariz. 2009) (finding that the request of a plaintiff with
schizophrenia and depression for an extended leave, which would have required his
employer to hire an expensive independent contractor, was not a reasonable
accommodation); Roberts v. Cty. of Fairfax, Va., 937 F. Supp. 541, 549 (E.D. Va.
1996) (finding that it was not a reasonable accommodation for an employer to grant
an employee with depression additional leave to fully recover); see also Hickox
Guzman, supra note 182, at 483, 486 (empirical evidence shows that short, definiteterm leave requests are most likely to be granted).
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balk at reasonable requests for necessary extensions of leave may be
exhibiting a bias against psychosocial disabilities, however; there is no
reason that recovery from a psychosocial condition should be handled
any differently than any other medically necessary leave.
4.

Modified Work Schedules

Another statutorily specified reasonable accommodation involves
part-time and modified work schedules. As several scholars have
pointed out, courts have been reluctant to grant such accommodations
in ADA cases generally. 8 4 Professor Nicole Buonocore Porter calls
these modifications in workplace "structural norms" - in other
words, "'when' and 'where' work is completed." 85 She identifies a
number of reasons why courts have antipathy to modifying structural
norms, including avoiding "special treatment" for ADA-protected
employees, concerns about worker resentment and effects on other
employees, and fear of the "slippery slope" bugaboo, under which
granting some modifications might invite a cascade of outlandish
proposals.1 86 Indeed, she points out, drawing on a convincing array of
case support, courts are much less likely to approve modifications in
structural norms than even far more expensive physical modifications
of the workplace.1 87
Porter and other scholars' observations about courts' general
hesitancy in ADA cases to approve modifications in workplace
"structural norms," such as job schedules and shifts, is even more
pronounced in social impairment cases. Courts sometimes deny
requests for modified or reduced work schedules in social impairment
cases on the ground that the plaintiff has requested such a schedule
due to "stress" arising from interpersonal relations.188 These courts
184

Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REv. 1, 70

(2014). Porter notes that earlier scholars have also made this observation. See id. at 70
n.527 (citing Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2005) [hereinafter

Transformative Potential]);see also

CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY
AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY & MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 671

(2010).

185 Porter, supra note 184, at 70.
186 See id. at 79-82.
187 Id. at 78-80.
188 See, e.g., Cannice v. Nw. Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1999)
(stating that it is not a reasonable accommodation to provide an employee with
depression with "an aggravation-free environment"); Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134
F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that it would not be a reasonable
accommodation to ensure that an employee with depression and anxiety did not have

2017]1

Analyzing Social Impairments

1153

point out that all jobs inherently require enduring stress, and assert
that employers should not be required to provide a non-stressful work
environment. In adopting this reasoning, courts fail to understand that
the plaintiff is not complaining about the general phenomenon of
stress, which all employees endure to some extent, but rather specific
conditions related to a particular impairment. Consider an analogy to
physical disability: a court could point out that virtually all jobs
involve some walking. This is generally true, but it often is possible to
modify a job so that a person in a wheelchair can do it. Likewise, all
jobs require significant commitment from employees, which often
creates stress. But surely some jobs (and, to be sure, not all jobs) can
be modified through adjusted work schedules to make them possible
for employees with impairments that cause heightened sensitivity to
long periods of stress at work.
In one Seventh Circuit case, for example, the court denied an
accommodation request for part-time work from an employee with
depression who worked as a directory assistance operator and could
no longer get through a full day without crying on the phone to
customers. 18 9 The court simply stated that "part time work is not a
reasonable accommodation for a full-time job."'90 Although, to be
sure, the essential functions of some jobs do require full-time work,
the job of phone directory operator would appear capable of being
divided into two part-time positions or being performed with some
breaks in which another employee filled in. When courts deny
requests to reduce hours or go part-time to plaintiffs with social
impairments, skepticism about such claims sometimes seems to
underlie their reasoning, a phenomenon disability rights advocates
and others should monitor and oppose. 191
any prolonged or inordinate stress). But see Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 120
(1st Cir. 2003) (ruling that it was a reasonable accommodation to put an employee on
full salary rather than commission sales to reduce pressure on him and to adjust the
employee's work schedule so he could avoid commuter traffic); Bultemeyer v. Fort
Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that it would be a
reasonable accommodation to put an employee with bipolar and anxiety disorder in a
"less stressful" work environment).
189 Lileikis v. SBC Ameritech, Inc., 84 F. App'x 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
the request of a plaintiff with depression who worked full time as a directory
assistance operator for the accommodation of part-time work).
190 Id.

191 To give an example, in Boutin v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 98,
105 (D. Mass. 2007), a plaintiff experiencing depression and an anxiety disorder asked
for a one-hour work schedule adjustment. The court denied this on the ground that
the request was not related to the plaintiffs "purported disability" but rather to his
"preference for a work day that matched his child's schedule more comfortably." Id.
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Thus, notwithstanding some contrary precedent, there is no reason
not to request part-time or modified work schedules as an
accommodation for a social impairment where this would be an
effective accommodation. A person with an anxiety disorder or
depression, for example, may find it much more possible to work a
shortened work schedule or to do some work at home in order to
lessen the social demands of work.1 92 Despite the failure of some
plaintiffs to make headway with such requests, plaintiffs' lawyers
should continue to push employers and courts to develop more
understanding. Through careful preparation before and during
litigation, lawyers can lay the factual and legal groundwork. They
should encourage employers and courts to abandon unhelpful prior
case law in order to bring the ADA into a better fit with the needs of
persons with social as well as physical impairments.
Social impairment cases in which courts have rejected modified
work schedules sometimes involve situations in which employees have
asked for day-to-day leeway in their work schedules, such as

What remained unrecognized in this court's unsympathetic characterization is that the
requested work schedule adjustment to match child care duties could help with
stressors contributing to the depression and anxiety. But see Rocafort, 334 F.3d at 120
(holding that it was a reasonable accommodation for an employer to adjust the work
schedule of an employee with an anxiety disorder to allow him to avoid commuter
traffic and also to restructure the employee's compensation methods in order to
reduce the work pressure he was experiencing).
192 See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a request to work at home would be unreasonable if it eliminates an
essential function of the job, but that summary adjudication was improper when an
employee with PTSD presented evidence that she could perform the essential
functions of her position at home, thereby making the at-home work accommodation
request at least facially reasonable); Burchett v. Target Corp., 340 F.3d 510, 517 (8th
Cir. 2003) (finding that it was a reasonable accommodation to restructure the
workload of an employee with depression by allowing her to work diminished hours
and providing flexibility in her schedule for medical appointments and other
scheduled meetings); Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.
2001) (stating that allowing an employee to work from home could be a reasonable
accommodation for OCD); Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10 C 405, 2012
WL 832889, at *15 (N.D. III. Mar. 8, 2012) (finding that it was a reasonable
accommodation to allow an employee with anxiety and panic disorder to work from
home); Thompson v. AT&T Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 661, 680 (W.D. Pa. 2005)
(finding that it would be a reasonable accommodation for an employee with
depression to be allowed to work at home six to eight hours a week); see also Beth Loy
& Melanie Whetzel, Accommodation and Compliance Series: Employees with Mental
Health Impairments, JOB
ACCOMMODATION
NETWORK
(Oct.
22,
2015),
http://askjan.org/media/Psychiatric.html (suggesting many accommodations related to
modified work schedules for employees with ASD, bipolar disorder, and general
"mental health impairments").
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permission to arrive late for work at the employee's option to deal
with the effects of depression or similar condition. Here courts are
especially likely to balk, privileging employers' interests in insisting on
punctuality and defined work schedules for all employees over the
individual needs of the ADA-covered employee. 193 Concern about coemployee resentment may be a factor as well. 194 Courts have approved
requests for a modified work schedule under which an employee starts
regularly on a specified later schedule.1 95 Here as in other situations to
be discussed below, accommodations that appear to maintain
employers' management prerogatives, such as the right to set
employee work schedules across the board rather than letting one
particular employee do so at her own discretion, tend to meet with
more success than do proposals that single out an affected employee
for what may appear to other employees as favored treatment.
5.

Job Reassignment to a Vacant Position

Another possible accommodation the ADA's text mentions is job
reassignment to a vacant position.1 96 The courts are divided on the
193

See, e.g., Rask v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 509 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir.

2007) (holding, in a case involving a plaintiff with depression, that "[wle have
'consistently held that regular and reliable attendance is a necessary element of most
jobs,' and we see no reason to hold otherwise in the circumstances of this case"); Earl
v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that it was not a
reasonable accommodation to allow an employee with OCD to clock in at whatever
time she arrived, without reprimand, and to permit her to make up the missed time at
the end of her shift); see also Porter, supra note 184, at 80-81 (noting that employers
resist introducing more laxness in attendance rules for ADA-protected employees
generally). But see McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2013)
(allowing, as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, an employee with
schizophrenia to work on an adjusted work schedule where he could bank time for
being late by working through lunch and leaving later).
194 See Heather Peters & Travor C. Brown, Mental Illness at Work: An Assessment of
Co-worker Reactions, 26 CANADIAN J. ADMIN. Sci. 38, 45 (2009) (finding that co-

workers were less likely to view longer/more frequent work breaks as appropriate
accommodations for employees with mental illness than flexible hours, banking of
overtime hours, and counseling). Research shows that employees who have had
workplace contact with persons with mental illness are more likely to support hiring
people with mental illness than those who have not had such exposure. Id. at 49.
195 See Rocafort, 334 F.3d at 120 (holding that it was a reasonable accommodation
for an employer to adjust the work schedule of an employee with an anxiety disorder
to allow him to avoid commuter traffic); see also Breen v. Dep't of Transp., 282 F.3d
839, 840-43 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that it could be a reasonable accommodation to
allow an employee with OCD to work an alternative work schedule of nine hours a
day and then an extra day off every other week).
196 In other cases, of course, the employee wants to remain in her old position and
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general standards for job reassignments under the ADA, 197 So this
issue is not without controversy in any disability case, but the
problems are compounded in social impairment cases.
Employees with psychosocial disabilities should be entitled to
transfer to vacant job positions if they are qualified to do these jobs
and require a transfer due to disability, just as an employee with a
physical disability would be.1 98 Recognizing this, some courts have
granted transfers in social impairment cases,1 99 but others have refused
transfer requests. 200 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has approved
the potential reasonableness of an employee's accommodation request
to be transferred to a less stressful work environment. 201 In other cases
employees have not fared as well. 202

-

it is the employer seeking to transfer her to a different position that she regards as less
desirable. In this scenario the plaintiff may be fighting reassignment and the lawyer
may be called upon to argue that the client can still do the essential functions of her
original position and that transfer is not appropriate.
197 See generally Porter, supra note 184, at 58-59.
198 See Coulson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 31 F. App'x 851, 857 (6th Cir.
2002) (stating that in general transfer or reassignment of an employee with depression
was within the realm of possible reasonable - and therefore required
accommodations, but such a transfer must be to a currently existing vacant position
for which the person is qualified, and the plaintiff in this case had not shown this);
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 809, 821 (S.D. Ohio 2006), affd,
485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting, in a case involving an employee with a
traumatic brain injury, that an employer need only reassign an employee to a vacant
position and need not create a new position or "bump" another employee from a
position to meet an accommodation request).
199 See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775-76 (3d
Cir. 2004) (allowing a police officer with depression who was not able to carry
firearms to transfer to a radio room position).
200 See, e.g., Coulson, 31 F. App'x at 857-58 (holding that it was not a reasonable
accommodation to transfer an employee to another department so he did not have to
work with certain individuals); Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp. 2d
1106, 1123 (D. Minn. 2011) (disapproving a transfer request based on the plaintiffs
need to avoid certain coworkers and the stress of the prior job position).
201 Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996). In this
case a school custodian developed bipolar disorder. The school district failed to
engage in a good faith interaction with him about possible accommodations, including
his request for a change in his building assignment, and the Seventh Circuit for this
reason reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. Id. at
1281-82, 1285.
202 See, e.g., Cannice v. Nw. Bank Iowa, N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that obligation to provide reasonable accommodations does not extend to
"an aggravation-free environment"); Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579-81
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a plaintiffs request for a transfer to reduce stress in his
work position was unreasonable as a matter of law on various grounds); Schwarzkopf,
833 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (holding that cessation of harassment and stress was not a
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Again, the concept of workplace stress plays heavily in courts'
reasoning. Courts that have rejected requests for job transfers based
on social impairments or other psychosocial disabilities generally state
that employees may not seek to "avoid stress" at work by transferring
positions. This perspective again evidences a bias against psychosocial
disabilities: just as an employee with a physical disability may need to
avoid lifting too much weight, yet still be able to do a job involving
lifting less weight, an employee with a psychosocial disability might
need to avoid experiencing too much stress, but still be able to do a
job involving less (but not zero) stress. Likewise, an employee with a
social impairment may not perform effectively at a job involving too
much or a certain type of interpersonal interaction, such as
Jakubowski, the medical intern who had difficulty interacting well
with patients in a family practice residency. But this same employee
might be effective if able to transfer to a job vacancy involving less or a
different kind of interpersonal interaction, as Jakubowski's employer
understood in suggesting he consider transferring to a residency in
pathology. 203 To avoid the potential snares raised by focusing on
workplace stress generally, plaintiffs' lawyers should emphasize the
individual's particular impairment in diagnostic terms, for example,
"social anxiety" rather than general work stress. 204
Note that there are two possible scenarios in which an employee
with a social impairment might need a job reassignment. One involves
situations, such as in Jacobs, in which an employee's job duties change
so that they begin to require social interaction that is problematic for
her, 205 or in which the employee's medical condition changes, as in
Heisler, where the plaintiff was experiencing severe depression, so that
she could no longer perform all of the functions required in a job that
she previously was able to perform. 206 These situations are analogous
to ones in which an employee's job duties change so that she is asked
to lift more weight than is possible for her, or she develops a disability
that makes the weight lifting that always accompanied her job now
impossible. These employees can no longer work for the employer if
they do not receive a job transfer. Courts may see the equities in this
type of case as strong, even though it still may be hard to win a
transfer, because the employer has available the argument that the
reasonable accommodations request).
203 Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 198-99 (6th Cir. 2010).
204 See, e.g., Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 574 (4th
Cir. 2015).
205 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 6 & 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing Heisler).
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employee is no longer qualified to perform the essential functions of
the job for which she was hired.
A different scenario arises when an employee argues that she cannot
do a job because of the actions or attitudes of particular supervisors or
coworkers. Here, she is not saying she can no longer do her existing
job because of changed circumstances but instead that persons in her
environment are interfering with her ability to work because of her
social impairment. As already noted, courts are especially loath to
approve accommodations where the social aspects of a work
environment become problematic. In these cases, it may be best to
emphasize changes in job duties or in the plaintiffs condition in
explaining the reasons for the job transfer request.
When employees seek a job transfer as an accommodation and state
that they wish to avoid specific individuals, their best chances of
success are when they can show that their employer has previously
granted transfer requests based on interpersonal conflict. As the court
in Felix v. City & County of Denver pointed out (although disapproving
the transfer request in that case), winning evidence should include the
fact that a vacant position exists, if this is the case, and that the
employer has granted transfer requests based on "personality
conflicts,"

without regard to disability,

in the past. 207 Similar

considerations apply for transfer requests based on an inability to
interact with coworkers. At least one court has found, in Roberts v.
County of Fairfax, that there was an issue of material fact as to whether
such a transfer request was a reasonable accommodation because the
employer had allowed such transfers in the past.208 These are thus

issues of fact ADA plaintiffs' lawyers should explore for their clients. 209
The reason the Felix and Roberts courts noted that evidence of prior
successful transfer requests by employees without disabilities should
be relevant in ADA cases is that comparator evidence establishes
disparate treatment under employment discrimination law generally.
Comparator evidence shows that an employer treated persons without
disabilities better, such as by allowing transfers based on interpersonal
conflict, than persons who requested such transfers for the same
reasons but who had a disability. This, at least, is a bottom line to
which plaintiffs can resort under appropriate facts: employers and
See Felix v. City & Cty. of Denver, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1265 (D. Colo. 2010).
208 See Roberts v. Cty. of Fairfax, 937 F. Supp. 541, 549-50 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(denying employer's summary judgment motion on these grounds). But see Coulson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 31 F. App'x 851, 858 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is
not a reasonable accommodation to request transfer to avoid certain individuals).
209 See Felix, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1265; Roberts, 937 F. Supp. at 549-50.
207
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courts should not deny accommodations requests in social impairment
cases when they would approve them in other scenarios. In other
words, obtaining workplace accommodations should not be any more
problematic for persons with social impairments than for persons with
other types of disabilities or no disability at all.
C.

Other Accommodations in Social Impairments Cases

Other types of appropriate accommodations for individuals with
social impairments are not specifically mentioned in the ADA's text
but may be equally appropriate. These can include requests for
changes in a workplace interpersonal environment, modification of
management methods, or reduction in social interaction demands.
Although the ADA makes clear that reasonable accommodations are
not limited to those listed in the statutory text, 21 0 courts are often
reluctant to grant such accommodations that address the interpersonal
aspects of work, even though these accommodations quite obviously
are the ones appropriate to address impairments in interpersonal
relations.
The problems plaintiffs with social impairments often face in getting
appropriate accommodations is yet another illustration of the general
problem of parity between so-called "mental" as opposed to "physical"
disabilities. This parity problem is a very real and continuing one, as
the research underlying this Article shows and as many disability
scholars have pointed out in addressing a variety of topics related to
psychosocial conditions. 211 Indeed, problems of parity between law's
treatment of so-called "mental" and "physical" conditions manifest
themselves throughout law. Consider, for example, doctrines that do
not allow recovery under workers' compensation laws for employees
whose injuries are related to workplace "stress." 212 Another example
involves the still existing lack of parity in insurance coverage for
"mental" versus "physical" conditions. 213 Still others concern the

.

210 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012) ("The term 'reasonable accommodation' may
include [list] and other similar accommodations. .
211 See literature cited supra note 17.
212

See generally MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORKPLACE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

945-49 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing and presenting case examples of courts'
unwillingness to allow workers' compensation recovery for injuries resulting from
general workplace stress).
213 See, e.g., Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008, H.R. 6983, 110th Cong. (2008), https://www.govtrack.ust
congress/bills/110/hr6983 (explaining that the goal of this defeated legislation was to
introduce health insurance parity for mental illness).
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differences in treatment under tort law of plaintiffs with mental versus
physical injuries. 214 And, as already discussed in sections III.B.4 & 5
above, even ADA case law eschews accommodations for workplace
"stress" that would be granted to individuals facing conditions
classified as "physical" impairments. 2 1 5 Nonetheless, the fact remains
that the ADA mandates that accommodations address the particular
impairments involved; logically enough, in social impairment cases the
accommodations plaintiffs need may involve modifications in a
workplace's interpersonalenvironment.
Such modifications do not address the workplace's physical
hardscape, such as installing a braille machine or a wheelchairaccessible bathroom, or even "structural norms," such as work
schedules and shifts. Instead, even worse from the perspective of many
courts, they address the amorphous realm of social environment.
Without further education, judges may regard accommodations
addressed to the interpersonal aspects of work as going beyond the
tangibles courts can or should address under the ADA.
One reason judges are reluctant to approve accommodations that
address interpersonal matters in the workplace relates to the general
background norms of U.S. employment law that disapprove of too
much legal intrusion into employers' "managerial prerogatives." 21 6 The

principle of management prerogatives holds that workplace regulation
should avoid interfering with employers' rights to manage their
workplaces as they see fit.217 The management prerogative doctrine
can easily bump up against ADA mandates, especially when plaintiffs
ask courts to order alterations in management styles or methods. But
in social impairments cases it is precisely these aspects of the
workplace that may need to be adjusted in order to allow an employee
to successfully perform her job.218 The adjustments may often be quite
214 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS
tort rules for nonphysical injuries).
215 See discussion supra sections III.B.4 & 5.

§ 10.14-.17 (1999) (discussing special

216 See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR

LAw 115-17 (1983) (discussing doctrine of management prerogatives).
217

See id.

See Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of Disability
in Organizations: Why Employers Resist Reasonable Accommodation, 25 WORK
OCCUPATIONS 397, 397 (1998) ("[E]mployers are reluctant to modify the social
structure of work because of their perceived need to contain the costs of reform and
maintain control of the work process."). For an example of a case in which a court
explicitly states this rationale for denying accommodations request, see Gaul v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 581 (3rd Cir. 1998), in which the court rejected the
plaintiff's request to be transferred away from individuals who were causing him
&

218
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small for the employer but produce large payoffs in the effectiveness of
an employee, in much the same way that small adjustments in
teaching methods may make a big difference to the learning of a
student covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 219
or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 220

Of course, some accommodations may be reasonable in a particular
workplace situation and others may not. It may not always be possible
to accommodate social impairments, just as it may not be possible to
accommodate physical ones. The point is simply that there is, or
should be, nothing "off limits" about granting accommodations that
go to the aspects of a workplace that involve social interactions, any
more than granting physical hardscape modifications that go to
ameliorating barriers posed by physical impairments. Courts have
quite a long way to go, however, in readily accepting accommodations
requests for adjustments in an employee's social environment. This
Part addresses that set of particularly difficult accommodations
proposals.
1.

Specific Personnel Changes

Not surprisingly, for the reasons already discussed, accommodations
requests for specific personnel changes, such as changes away from a
particular supervisor, are difficult to win. 221 A few courts have been

willing to entertain such requests but in the end rejected them. 222 Even
inordinate stress on the grounds that this was "essentially asking this court to
establish the conditions of his employment" and that "nothing in the law leads us to
conclude that in enacting the disability acts, Congress intended to interfere with
personnel decisions within an organizational hierarchy."
219 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012).
220 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
221 See, e.g., Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that it is not a reasonable accommodation to require an employer to switch
an employees' supervisor); Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1106,
1122-23 (D. Minn. 2011) (holding that it was not a reasonable accommodation
request to be transferred to avoid certain co-workers); Felix v. City & Cty. of Denver,
729 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1265 (D. Colo. 2010) (holding that employees must come
forward with evidence to overcome the presumption that a supervisory transfer would
be unreasonable).
1
222 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that a per se rule that replacement of a supervisor can never be a reasonable
accommodation is "inconsistent with our ADA case law," but holding on the facts of
the case that it was not a reasonable accommodation to switch the employee to a new
supervisor since it could not be accomplished without excessive organizational costs
and since the employee's request was not simply for reassignment to a different
supervisor but also for protection from any interaction with the previous supervisor
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when a plaintiff convincingly demonstrated that a particularly abusive
supervisor's tendency to shout at employees aggravated his depression
and anxiety, for example, the court in Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp.
held that it was not a reasonable accommodation for the employee to
ask that the supervisor and others cease such harassment or,
alternatively, for a transfer to another supervisor. 223 There appears to
be no particularly good rationale for such a holding other than courts'
fear that plaintiffs may seek to abuse the protections of the ADA by
attempting to resolve mere interpersonal workplace conflicts through
its protections. Since the ADA's high threshold requirements for
establishing a covered disability protect against the dangers of such
abuse, as already discussed, 224 courts' reasoning in this regard appears
unduly crabbed. Some disabilities may make working with an abusive
supervisor not simply unpleasant but impossible. Why should a
person with such an impairment not receive the effective
accommodation of changing supervisors when not unduly
burdensome, just as an employee with a physical disability might need
the accommodation of changing office equipment in order to
effectively perform her job? To hold that changes in physical
environment are reasonable but changes in the interpersonal
environment are not is to privilege the physical world over the social
or interpersonal one in a manner that also privileges the
accommodation of physical impairments over social ones.
The most favorable cases involving accommodations requests for
transfer away from particular supervisors emphasize the ADA's explicit
statutory language providing that transfers to vacant positions may be
a reasonable accommodation, as already discussed in section III.B.5
and this would be virtually impossible given the specifics of the employee's job).
223 Schwarzhopf, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (stating that there exists "no authority for
the proposition that cessation of harassment is a required reasonable accommodation"
(citations omitted)). But see Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of
the 'DangerousMentally Ill,'34 UC DAVIS L. REV. 849, 910 (2001) ("Because aggressive,
badgering and assaultive conduct does not advance any legitimate interest of the
employer, and risks running afoul of federal anti-discrimination statutes and state tort
laws, employers should prohibit and discourage such conduct.... This type of
accommodation would advance the employer's interest in avoiding workplace violence
without incurring an undue hardship.").
224 See supra Part 1. A plaintiff with a social impairment who argues that she could
do her job if she were only transferred to another supervisor may run into problems in
establishing that she has a covered disability. The court in Weiler, 101 F.3d at 525, for
example, held that the plaintiff, a senior account clerk who developed depression and
anxiety because of criticism from her supervisor, showed that she was not
"significantly limited" for purposes of the ADA because she argued that she could do
the same job under a different supervisor.
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above. 225 In other words, the best way to cast an accommodations
request to move out of a particular work environment may be to ask
for transfer to an open position for which the plaintiff is qualified.
2.

Modifying Supervision Methods

-

Another accommodation that is hard to win in social impairments
cases involves requests that supervisors modify supervision methods.
Some such requests might be for supervisors to be more explicit about
work expectations, break tasks into smaller chunks, or give more
frequent or specific feedback to an employee. Others might involve
requests that supervisors avoid harsh supervision techniques

226
shouting, undue criticism, unreasonable demands, and the like.

These are all requests that courts appear loath to approve because they
go to altering the interpersonal environment of the workplace.
Some courts have approved minor modifications in management
methods, such as accommodations that called for a supervisor to give
an employee with a social impairment daily performance updates or
feedback on interpersonal weaknesses.22 7 The challenge has been
convincing those employers and courts that are skeptical about legal
intrusion on employers' management discretion. Winning arguments
must point to the payoffs of improved job effectiveness on the part of
an ADA-protected employee, as weighed against minor management
adjustments. It appears best to cast the accommodation request as
narrowly as possible, painting a picture that avoids sounding like the
accommodation will involve a major intrusion into managers'

225 See supra section III.B.5.
226 See generally STEFAN, supra note 17, at 138-40 (noting problematic nature of
such supervisor behavior for persons with psychiatric disabilities).
227 See Connolly v. Entex Info. Servs., Inc., 27 F. App'x 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding in a case involving an employee with autism spectrum disorder, it was a
reasonable accommodation for the employer to reduce the number of assignments
given to the employee, and to instruct his supervisor to show him with more
specificity how to do his tasks and give him a checklist and binder in which he could
take notes and track pertinent data in order to aid him with record-keeping
difficulties); Bennett v. Unisys Corp., No. 2:99CV0446, 2000 WL 33126583, at *10
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000) (approving supervisory method modifications as potential
reasonable accommodations for an employee with inappropriate interpersonal skills
due to major depression); see also Tucker, supra note 151 (discussing case examples).
But see Schwarzkopf, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23 (rejecting reasonable accommodation
request for written instructions to complete work made by a plaintiff experiencing
depression). The court's reasoning in Schwartzkopf was that the plaintiff could not be
entitled to the accommodation he requested because he had claimed that he was
capable of performing his job's essential functions. Id.
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prerogatives. For example, instead of asking for a change in
"management methods" to provide more intensive, positive, and/or
frequent feedback to support the employee's interpersonal
interactions, it might be preferable to frame the accommodation as a
restructuring of the employee's job duties (without eliminating
essential functions, of course) so that the job becomes one that
requires less independence from supervision. This makes the
accommodation appear to be about the particular employee rather
than about general management methods.
A survey of cases helps delineate the still fuzzy lines between what
courts are and are not likely to endorse. As scholars examining ADA
cases generally have noted, requests that sound like alterations in
physical environment work best. 228 Thus, where possible, changes

should be cast as being about the employee's natural rather than social
environment. For example, the Seventh Circuit endorsed an
accommodation request that involved a switch in workroom
assignments so that an employee with depression would experience
natural light. 229 Similarly, courts have occasionally approved shift

changes from night to day on the ground that daylight would be better
for employees with depression. 230
3.

Providing for Less Social Interaction

Yet another complex accommodation issue from courts' perspectives
involves employee requests for less social interaction in the workplace.
Courts tend to be unsympathetic; this response again points towards a
lack of parity in courts' handling of social impairment cases. The

228 See, e.g., STEFAN, supra note 17, at 58-59, 103-42 (presenting excellent early
discussion of courts' bias on these issues in cases involving plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities); Porter, supra note 184, at 5-6; cf. Travis, Transformative Potential, supra
note 184, at 6.
229 See Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2009); see
also Mustafa v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that it would be a reasonable accommodation to place an employee with depression in
a non-classroom setting).
230 See, e.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that it was a reasonable accommodation to transfer an employee with
depression and anxiety from the night to the daytime shift); Norman v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, No. CIV.A. 00-1655, 2002 WL 32194730, at *18-19 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17,
2002) (finding that it was a reasonable accommodation to allow an employee with
anxiety, depression and panic disorder to switch shifts). But see Heisler v. Metro.
Council, 339 F.3d 622, 625-30 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs request for
shift change from day to night to help with depression because she oversaw an activity
done only at night).
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landscape is still murky on this score, however. Sometimes these
requests prevail, at least at the stage of avoiding an adverse ruling on
summary judgment, as in Jacobs, the case involving the request of an
employee with social anxiety for fewer (though not zero) hours
working at the customer service counter. 23 1 And sometimes the
essential functions of the position do require a great deal of
interpersonal interaction, so that an employee whose social
impairment interferes with effectiveness in this realm will in fact be
unable to perform the essential functions of the position. 232 This
Article's arguments do not deny that this can be true - just that it is
less often true than courts are yet willing to see. An example is again
Jakubowski, involving the medical resident in family practice whose
Asperger's syndrome interfered with his ability to effectively interact
with his patients. 233 There the employer may well have been right to
suggest a field of medicine for this employee that did not require so
much patient interaction.
Whether courts will approve accommodations requests for less
interpersonal interaction can depend on the nature of the plaintiffs
job. In Moore v. Computer Associates International, for example, the
plaintiffs job was as an instructional consultant for computer users at
businesses. 234 The court held that his request to teach solely by
Internet was not reasonable because face-to-face interaction with
clients was an essential function of his position. 235 In St. Hilaire v.
Minco Products, Inc., a court stated that a supervisor with Tourette's
syndrome could not be entitled to complete isolation on the job
because interacting with others was an essential function of his job.236
These conclusions make sense given the jobs at issue. But less
defensible is another case involving a plaintiff with Tourette's
syndrome, Ray v. Kroger Co., already discussed in sections II.A.1 & 2
above, where the employee's job was as a night-shift grocery shelf
stocker. 237 If interacting with others was an essential job function even
231 See supra text accompanying notes 110-20.
232 See, e.g., Franklin v. City of Slidell, 969 F. Supp. 2d 644, 655 (E.D. La. 2013)
(finding that it was not reasonable to request that a city remove from the duties of a
senior corrections officer with PTSD all but "administrative duties," and in effect
create a new "light duty" job to accommodate him).
233 Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 199 (6th Cir. 2010).
234 Moore v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, 653 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (D. Ariz. 2009).
235 Id. at 964.
236 St. Hilaire v. Minco Prods., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1005-06 (D. Minn. 2003)
(noting that it is not a reasonable accommodation for an employee to be completely
isolated in the workplace).
237 Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
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on that case's facts, then the need to be able to interact successfully
with others must be an essential function of almost all work
situations. Whether this is so remains to be seen; courts' views may
change over time as their understanding of the nature of social
impairments and tolerance for human difference improves. More
enlightened views may allow more employees to work without the
need to engage in a level of face-to-face interactions that may be
problematic for them. Such developments would advance the ADA's
goals of allowing more persons with disabilities to enter the workplace
and live economically and societally productive lives. For the time
being, however, given the enormous progress that still needs to be
made in general understandings of differences related to social
impairments, lawyers for plaintiffs may do best casting
accommodations requests in language that emphasizes physical rather
than interpersonal adjustments.238
A final category of accommodations involves those courts are least
likely to approve. These are ones that have met with most skepticism
in the ADA commentators' literature as well, though this Article is in
part a plea for ADA scholars to think somewhat differently about these
matters. I discuss some of these scenarios below.
4.

Accommodations Courts Are Least Likely to Approve

a.

Requests for Reinstatement After Quitting ajob

-

Unfortunately for persons with social impairments, and for the state
of ADA law and inclusion of a broader range of human variation as
well, the kinds of accommodations courts are least likely to endorse
disproportionally impact plaintiffs with social impairments. One
frequently disapproved accommodation involves requests to rehire
employees who may have, perhaps impetuously, quit their jobs
very possibly because of workplace conflict they lacked the tools to
handle due to a social impairment. In Brundage v. Hahn, for example,
an employee with bipolar disorder precipitously quit her position and
then filed suit under the ADA seeking reinstatement as a reasonable
accommodation. 239 The court had no sympathy for her, pronouncing
that the ADA is not a statute about granting "second chances." 240
238 An employee might, for example, consider asking for equipment to support
frequent teleconferencing rather than asking to be exempt from attending in-person
office meetings.
239 Brundage v. Hahn, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
240 Id. (stating that reasonable accommodation under the ADA does not include
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Cases like Brundage and others testify to the importance of lawyers
or other skilled advocates and advisors intervening early to stop a
problematic situation from becoming worse while reasonable
accommodations are negotiated. 24 1 A salient goal for ADA lawyers
should be to find creative ways to "run interference," so to speak, to
prevent workplace conflicts involving an employee with a social
impairment from escalating. Precisely because ability to interact with
others can be such an important skill, an employer that has lost
patience with an employee after a series of contentious situations may
be less likely to respond to the employee's requests for
accommodations with enthusiasm or even good faith. Contentious
background facts may also make it less likely that a plaintiff will meet
with a court's sympathy in challenging an employer's refusal to grant
requested accommodations. In these situations, early, creative, and
skillful lawyering interventions can make a major difference.
b.

Setting Aside DisciplinaryActions

Another set of accommodations courts tend to disapprove seek to
set aside or forgive disciplinary actions against an employee for
conduct related to a social impairment. Especially where an
employee's perceived misconduct has been disruptive, courts show
little willingness to take into account the connection between the
employee's unresolved, untreated, or under-treated disorder and the
misconduct that took place. 242 Here, too, more enlightenment about
excusing a failure to control a disability or giving an employee a "second chance" to
control the disability in the future); see also Wooten v. Acme Steel Co., 986 F. Supp.
524, 528-29 (N.D. 111. 1997) (finding that it was not a reasonable accommodation to
re-hire an individual who resigned his position while in a manic depressive state he
called "uncontrollable").
241 The fact that this is often not the case poses an important problem that effective
disability rights training and advocacy must address.
242 See, e.g., Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that
it was not a reasonable accommodation to require an employer to refrain from
investigating and potentially disciplining an employee with anxiety and panic
disorders who had allegedly written a letter disclosing company secrets); Cohen v.
Ameritech Corp., No. 02 C 7378, 2003 WL 23312801, at *6 (N.D. 111. Dec. 23, 2003)
(finding that it would be unreasonable for an employer to exempt an employee with
anxiety and panic disorder from remote monitoring or other disciplinary measures,
and stating that expecting an employer to withhold discipline from an employee who
is not performing up to expectations is not a reasonable accommodation). See
generally Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187 (2005) (analyzing how courts have treated ADA
cases involving disability-related misconduct and arguing that misconduct should not
be a per se bar to accommodation).
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the nature of social impairment may lead to more enlightened results,
but for the time being it is much more effective to intervene before a
disciplinary incident than attempt to remedy it post hoc.
These cases again point to the importance of obtaining employers'
initial willingness to consider accommodations for employees with
social impairments. Such employees may come across to others,
including those in authority positions, as somewhat "difficult,"
obstinate, resistant to supervision, and the like. 243 Social impairments

may contribute to social gaffes that may undermine an employer's
good will toward the employee. In other situations, an employee may
not be well liked by peers, and this may lead to escalating conflicts
that result in the employee being terminated. Or, co-worker
mistreatment may be entirely the fault of the co-workers, as in
countless examples of workplace bullying where employees single out
the most vulnerable or defenseless for cruel mistreatment. 244
As I have argued in another article addressing race and sex
discrimination law, in many situations where there has been no
significant harm or threat of harm to others, such when an employee
has engaged in a short verbal outburst or brief refusal to carry out an
order, courts should not necessarily assume that an employer's
discipline, such as for "insubordination," should stand. 245 Instead, in
considering discipline cases, courts should give more thought to the
level or type of misconduct involved. This is precisely what the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and reviewing courts do in
the labor law context, where employees are protected from precipitous
dismissal under a "just cause" standard. 246 Courts look behind the
discipline to understand its background. Was the employee provoked,
for example? Were there other reasons for the misconduct when
probed?

&

243 See Barclay & Markel, supra note 17, at 333 ("Individuals with psychiatric
disabilities often evoke negative reactions from those in their environment."); cf.
Susan D. Carle, General Essay, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordinationin Title VII
Cases, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 188 (2016) (noting reasons employees may
appear difficult to employers when they seek to protest humiliating discriminatory
actions against them).
244 See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 480-82 (2000)
(discussing the problem of workplace bullying).
245 See Carle, supra note 243, at 185-89 (analyzing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
246 For a general discussion of the just cause standard, see Roger I. Abrams
Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985
DUKE L.J. 594, 611-12.
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-

This is all the more important when an employee's short outburst or
other mild form of so-called "insubordination," a frequent cause of
employee discipline, results from a social impairment. The employee
may lack the abilities to skillfully handle conflict in particular
situations, but this impairment may be effectively addressed with
minor accommodations such as a job coach, restructuring of duties,
lessening of face-to-face interaction demands, provision of a rest or
quiet area or opportunity for a "time out," use of online
communications technology, or any combination of these and other
similar accommodations, as discussed throughout Part III of this
Article.
In short, the Brundage court was arguably wrong when it stated that
the ADA should not grant "second chances." 247 There is nothing
inevitable about that rule. The most evolved context in U.S.
employment law - that which applies in the union context
requires graduated, "for cause" discipline, and in fact does provide for
second chances where appropriate. 248 Why should the ADA not
develop a measured "some second chances" doctrine as well? 249
To suggest this is by no means to argue that persons with social
impairments should be impervious to workplace discipline. Many
kinds of misconduct are obviously grounds for termination.
Employers should not be required to put up with employees who are
unfit simply because those employees have diagnosed disabilities.
Instead, this Article proposes that courts take a more nuanced
approach to evaluating employer disciplinary actions. Some employee
wrongdoings, such as acts of dishonestly or physical assault, are off
limits under any circumstances. But some other kinds of brief, isolated
misconduct, such as talking too much, engaging in a short verbal
outburst out of frustration, or simply failing to sufficiently curry favor
with a boss, may go to social impairments that the employee is unable
to control without help and that do not interfere with workplace
functioning in any significant way. Granting a bit of leeway on minor
behavioral matters may create a more inviting workplace for all, one in
which demonstrating a modicum of forgiveness to employees goes a
247 Brundage v. Hahn, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 1997).
248 See generally Abrams & Nolan, supra note 246, at 612 (explaining that
industrial due process in the union context requires "the imposition of discipline in
gradually increasing degrees").
249 See Timmons, supra note 242, at 288-94 (presenting a compelling argument for
some second chances under the ADA in "low severity" misconduct cases); cf. Carle,
supra note 243, at 212-15 (arguing for some second chances for employees under Title
VII in "mild to moderate" insubordination cases).

1170

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 50:1109

long way towards nurturing employees' reciprocal loyalty and good
faith towards their employer. A world that understood disability better
and sought to gain the benefits of neurodiversity would be a more
understanding world, not only for persons with disabilities but for
others as well.
c.

"Harm to Others" Cases

Courts are least likely to order accommodations for employees
whose prior conduct has involved any type of harm or threat of harm
to others (or self).250 "Harm to others" is a defense in ADA cases built
into the language of the statute, 251 so these cases may be correctly
decided - unless, of course, they are based on stereotypes about
persons with social impairments, which all too often may be
present. 252 Again, the best solutions to reasonable accommodations in
social impairments cases are ones in which lawyers or other skilled
advocates are able to intervene early enough to head off escalating
conflict. Early intervention can not only deescalate conflict, but also
lead to the development of better facts, and, most beneficially where
possible, avoid unnecessary adverse actions against employees and
costly, unproductive litigation.
IV.

USING THE

ADA'S

"REGARDED As" PRONG IN SOCIAL
IMPAIRMENTS CASES

Another potential strategy in social impairments cases makes use of
the third, "regarded as" prong of the definition of covered disability
under Title I of the ADA. As already noted, this prong protects
individuals from employment discrimination based on being "regarded
as" having a physical or mental impairment. 253 The ADAAA added that
an "individual meets the requirement of 'being regarded as having
such an impairment' if the individual establishes that he or she has
been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of
250 See, e.g., McElwee v. Cty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 645-46 (2d Cir. 2012)
(refusing to grant a second chance to a plaintiff with PDD-NOS who sexually harassed
a fellow worker); Palmer v. Circuit Court, Soc. Serv. Dep't, 905 F. Supp. 499, 511
(N.D. 111. 1995) (finding that an employee who made abusive and profane statements
to other employees could not be accommodated for her depression and paranoia
because her conduct put others in danger).
251

See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012).

252 See Hubbard, supra note 223, at 852 ("A hasty or reflexive resort to the direct

threat provision to exclude persons with mental disorders, however, is neither
warranted by the facts nor permitted by the ADA.").
253 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (2012).
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an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity."25 4
Thus the ADAAA clarified that an individual does not have to prove a
limitation or perceived limitation on a major life activity in order to
use the regarded as prong. The ADAAA further provides that the
regarded as prong cannot be used for reasonable accommodations, 255
and that the regarded as prong "shall not apply to impairments that
are transitory and minor," which it defines as lasting six months or
less. 256 Thus, the regarded as prong protects employees from
discrimination for being perceived as having an impairment that is not
transitory or minor, even as it, at the same time, does not provide a
basis for requesting accommodations. This provision has the potential
to greatly improve the ADA's protection for employees who may not
be able to prove a limitation on a major life activity despite suffering
from employment discrimination because they are regarded as having
an impairment.
In the social impairments context, the regarded as prong of the ADA
could be exactly what a plaintiff needs to gain relief where she can
perform the essential functions of the job without accommodations.
The fact that an employer or coworkers perceive an employee as
having a social impairment can support an ADA claim when an
adverse employment action occurs as a result. In other words,
individuals may face discrimination in the workplace solely because
they are perceived to be different or impaired. What they may need is
for employers to instruct their agents to refrain from discriminatory
conduct on the basis of these perceptions. If the employer's agents
simply accepted the employee's perceived difference, there would be
no problem, for either the employee or the employer. ADA plaintiffs'
lawyers should thus keep the regarded as prong in mind in
negotiations with employers when their client does not require
accommodations. Indeed, lawyers should use and highlight the
regarded as prong of Title I's definition of disability whenever
appropriate in representing persons with social impairments, at all
stages of the representation. The ADA seeks to protect the rights of
persons with social impairments, equally with those having "physical"
impairments, to live lives free from stigma, including discrimination in
254 Id. § 12102(3)(A); see also Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 814 F.3d 581, 589-90 (1st
Cir. 2016) (applying this new ADAAA standard for regarded as claims in an ADA Title
11 case and noting the significance of this change).
255
256

42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2012).
Id. § 12102(3)(B) ("A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or

expected duration of 6 months or less.").
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employment. The mandates of Title I of the ADA apply to all
recognized impairments, including those involving social functioning,
even though these impairments may "rub people the wrong way."
Studies by evolutionary biologists suggest that humans may be
predisposed to react negatively to those perceived as different, and that
these tendencies may have been adaptive at some point in human
evolution. 257 Today, however, social policy reflects a strong consensus
that racial and ethnic discrimination causes great harm; discriminatory
acts based on such perceptions of difference are, accordingly, illegal.
258 Discrimination on the basis of perceived social "otherness" due to
perceptions of mildly odd behavior - in other words, discrimination
on the basis of perceived neurodiversity - likewise is and should be
illegal, in recognition of the similar harm such discrimination causes
to victims and society alike. 259

That someone seems a bit different socially - even unlikeable or
strange - is not a reason to discriminate in employment any more
than is discrimination on the basis of a physical difference that
someone considers unattractive (provided, of course, in both
categories of cases, that the individual can perform the essential
functions of the job). 260 As with any other perceived impairment, and
sometimes even more so, persons with social impairments face the
problem of stigma. 261 For this reason, the ADA's regarded as prong can
257 See, e.g., Ross A. Hammond & Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Ethnocentrism,
50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 926, 927 (2006) (finding on the basis of mathematical modeling
and empirical study that an innate predisposition to favor ones "in-group" can support

very high levels of cooperation). But see BERNARD E. WHITLEY JR. & MARY E. KITE, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 22-23 (2006) (summarizing critiques of
sociobiological explanations of prejudice). See generally THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF
ETHNOCENTRISM: EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSIONS OF XENOPHOBIA, DISCRIMINATION, RACISM
AND NATIONALISM (Vernon Reynolds et al. eds., 1987) (presenting theories linking

discrimination to evolutionary biology).
258 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)
(defining as "unlawful" employment discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin, and several other protected characteristics).
259 Cf Hammond & Axelrod, supra note 257, at 933 (discussing evolutionary
biology findings as to the possible causes of ethnocentric biases of many types).
260 Sometimes a particular job may require high social skills, and a certain degree
of social impairment may be disqualifying, as already discussed. But in many other
situations, the same impairment may not be disqualifying, as, for example, in the
potential difference between being a family practice doctor versus a pathologist
discussed in relation to the medical resident with Asperger's syndrome in Jakubowski
v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 203 (6th Cir. 2010).
261 See, e.g., Patrick W. Corrigan & Amy C. Watson,
Understanding the Impact of
Stigma on People with Mental Illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (2002) (noting that a
large majority of the United States and Western Europe have a stigmatizing attitude
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be of special help to persons with social impairments. As the Supreme
Court stated in School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,262 the
only case in which it has interpreted the regarded as prong (in that
case, under a predecessor statute that served as the basis for the ADA's
regarded as provision 263), disability can arise "as a result of the
negative reactions of others," so that "society's accumulated myths and
fears . . . are as handicapping as are the . . . limitations that flow from
actual impairment." 264 In other words, the reactions of others to a
person with a social impairment can be the entire problem. Social
impairments are thus a prime illustration of the "social model" of
disability, which sees disability not as a medical condition but as the
result of "the interaction between persons with impairments and
attitudinal and environmental barriers[.] "2651n other words, the social
environment constructs the disability. If a person who does not interact
easily with others were not stigmatized, there would be no
impairment. It is the very perception of an impairment, and the
negative reaction the perception produces, that creates disability"but for" the negative response from others no disability would exist.
Enforcing the regarded as prong in these cases could have great
potential to reduce the problem of social impairment discrimination.
A helpful analogy comes from Mari Matsuda's discrimination theory
work on accent discrimination. 266 In a now-classic article, Matsuda
shows that the real problem in discrimination against persons with
non-dominant accents may arise, not from the person with the accent,
but from the listener who does not have the cultural competence or
patience to comprehend the person's accent. 267 As Matsuda notes, in a
globalized world that mixes together speakers of many languages, the
best policy choice in the situation of a speaker with heavily accented
but intelligible English would be to put the burden of understanding
towards about mental illness); Graham C.L. Davey, Mental Health & Stigma, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/why-we-worry/
201308/mental-health-stigma (noting that many face stigma for their mental illness).
262 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
263 This statute was the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. H§ 701-718,
which, in sections 503 and 504, imposes disability nondiscrimination mandates on
federal contractors and programs receiving federal funds respectively. See id.
264 Id. at 283-84.
265 See G.A. Res. 61/106, annex, Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Preamble (e) (Dec. 13, 2006). See generally Bagenstos, supra note 146
(discussing the systematic social impairment caused by society's institutions).
266 My thanks to Noah Zatz for suggesting this comparison.
267 Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1375 (1991).
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on listeners, who should be encouraged to develop the listening skills
to function in a richly diverse, multi-lingual world. 268

In much the same way, the better policy choice for social
impairments would put the burden of appreciating neurodiversity 269
on the audience rather than on the person performing social
conventions in a non-typical manner. From this perspective, it is not
the person with depression who avoids extraneous social contact that
is the problem, but the people who form negative judgments based on
that person's lack of interest in extra social interaction. Encouraging
tolerance in the workplace for a wider range of social performances
not only opens more opportunities for employment success for
persons with social impairments, but also produces better workplaces
along many axes of diversity, as human difference in general becomes
a workplace feature to be valued rather than denigrated. Social
difference itself may be accompanied by positive attributes, such as an
ability to think "outside the box" or to perceive or be sensitive to
matters others do not notice. And workplace cultures that accept and
embrace differences in social functioning open themselves up to
accepting difference in other positive ways as well, promoting the
benefits workplace diversity brings on many fronts simultaneously.
Just as empirical research has found that diversity in life experiences
and backgrounds leads to better decision-making within groups, the
acceptance of the neurodiversity also may benefit a work group's
product or mission. 270
Despite these potential benefits of enforcing the regarded as prong
following the ADAAA's amendments, few reported cases turn on this
provision. 271 Even fewer involve individuals with social
268 Id. at 1396.
269 See discussion supra note 11.
270 See, e.g., STEVE SILBERMAN, NEUROTRIBES: THE LEGACY OF AUTISM AND THE FUTURE
OF NEURODIVERSITY 429-32 (2015) (quoting autistic author Temple Grandin and
Oliver Sacks' dialogues on the contributions of Grandin's perspective to her
profession). As other examples, high creativity has been correlated with bipolar
disorder. See generally KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: MANIC-DEPRESSIVE
ILLNESS AND THE ARTISTIC TEMPERAMENT (1994). Persons on the autism spectrum

sometimes have special talents such as extreme musicality, artistic capacities, or
mathematical facility. See SILBERMAN, supra, at 34-36 (noting that a number of persons
historically considered great scientists appear to have had Asperger's syndrome, such
as British chemist and physicist Henry Cavendish).
271 See Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Analysis of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2051-52, 2052 tbl. 3 (2013) (reporting
surprise at finding, on the basis of comprehensive empirical analysis, fewer prong
three cases, for a total of only eight cases, after the ADAAA than before its passage);
Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct at 25 Years: Lessons to Learn from
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impairments. 272 Pre-ADAAA, an employer's admission that it took an
adverse employment action against an employee because it perceived
the employee as odd or different did not establish that the employer
perceived the employee as having a covered "impairment." For
example, in Merrill v. Burke E. Porter Machinery Co., the employer's
agent stated that he fired an employee because his lack of eye contact
made him appear untrustworthy. 273 The employee had Asperger's
syndrome and disclosed this to his employer, but the actual decisionmaker involved in the termination testified that he did not know this
nor what Asperger's syndrome was; 274 he simply viewed the employee

negatively based on his eye contact deficits.2 7 5 The court held that
under these facts the employer was not liable for discrimination under
the ADA because its decision-maker had fired the employee for lack of
eye contact, not for having Asperger's syndrome. 276
Post-ADAAA, it remains unresolved whether the regarded as prong
protects persons from discrimination on the basis of perceived traits of
an impairment rather than solely on the basis of perceptions of a known
diagnosis. In other words, should the court in Merrill have held that the
decision maker's negative reaction to a lack of eye contact, a common
feature of Asperger's syndrome, violated the regarded as prong? The
legislative history of the ADAAA leaves this important issue up in the
air. Professor Michelle Travis has carefully examined the legislative
history of the ADAAA and the EEOC's subsequent work in
promulgating interpretative regulations. She concludes that Congress
did intend the ADAAA to protect plaintiffs from trait-based
discrimination under the regarded as prong of § 12102(1)(C).277
Professor Travis points out that the EEOC's initial interpretative
278
regulations explicitly covered trait or symptom-based discrimination.
the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REv. 819, 837
(2015) (noting the lack of "regarded as" cases under the ADA).
272 But see Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 814 F.3d 581, 584 (1st Cir. 2016) (sustaining
against a statute of limitations challenge a Title II regarded as claim in which the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants regarded her as having an unspecified mental
impairment).
273 Merrill v. Burke E. Porter Mach. Co., 159 F. App'x 676, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2005).
274 Id. at 679.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Michelle A. Travis, The Part and Parcel of Impairment Discrimination, 17 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 35, 52-54 (2013) [hereinafter Part and Parcel].
278 Id. at 49-54; see also Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can't Do for Disability Rights, BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB.
LAw 203, 219 (2010) (arguing for this position on the basis of the EEOC's proposed
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These draft regulations stated that discrimination based on an actual or
perceived impairment "includes, but is not limited to, an action based
on a symptom of such an impairment" regardless of whether the
employer is aware of an individual's underlying condition. 279 As
Professor Travis documents in detail, these proposed regulations turned
out to be controversial, with representatives of various constituencies
testifying both in favor and against the EEOC's proposal. The business
community, as might be expected, opposed including trait-based
discrimination under the ADA on the grounds that such an
interpretation would limit employers' ability to discipline or terminate
employees for conduct-related workplace problems. 280 Travis argues
that these fears were overblown, pointing to the voluminous case law
reflecting courts' lack of patience for plaintiffs with conduct-related
impairments. 28 1 In any event, in its final regulations the EEOC removed
the proposed language that would have stated that trait-based
discrimination constitutes impairment discrimination under the
regarded as prong of the ADA. 282 The EEOC emphasized, however, that
its failure to retain this language in its final regulations should not be
read as the EEOC's decision on the question. 283 Presumably, the EEOC
intended to leave the issue to the courts.
interpretative regulations).
279 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48443 (proposed Sept. 23,
2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
280 See Travis, Partand Parcel, supra note 277, at 42-44.
281 See id. at 50-60. This Article has invoked that same general
body of case law,
but to make a different point. Travis is correct in her descriptive claim that courts very
often reject conduct-related impairment claims. This Article, on the other hand,
opposes continuation of judicial attitudes that deny ADA protection to plaintiffs
whose impairments may include non-typical behavior or conduct that does not go to
the essential functions of a job or present danger to self or others. I thus disagree with
Travis in the following respect: opponents of the EEOC's proposed regulation to
include trait-based discrimination under § 12102(1)(C) were correct when they
argued that protecting trait-based discrimination would increase protections for some
employees with conduct-related impairments. But this would have been a beneficial
development, because impairment discrimination should be unlawful regardless of the
type of impairment at issue - provided, of course, that the defenses that apply in any
discrimination case are defeated, including defenses that the employee's conduct
interfered with performing the essential functions of the job. Absent applicable
defenses, conduct-related traits should be covered under the ADA's regarded as prong
on the same basis as the traits of other impairments.
282 See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978, 17007 (Mar. 25,
2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
283 Id. at 16985 ("No negative inference concerning the merits of this issue should
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ADA lawyers using the regarded as prong thus should be aware that
courts may conclude that the ADA does not protect employees with
social impairments from adverse actions based on employers' regarding
them as having negatively perceived, impairment-related traits such as
social withdrawal, awkward or inappropriate social conduct, or failure
to follow typical social conventions such as eye contact, conversational
style, gregariousness and the like. To be protected, an employee may
need to show that an employer regarded her as having a recognized
diagnosis rather than simply the attributes of an impairment. But there
are equally strong arguments available to support protection against
trait-based discrimination under the regarded as prong. One of these
arguments, especially pertinent in the social impairments context, is
that it often is the very ignorance of employers and others as to the
neurological basis of traits such as lack of eye contact that leads to
discrimination against otherwise qualified employees, as in Merrill.2 8 4 If

trait-based discrimination does not receive protection under the ADA's
regarded as prong, then ignorant employers are immune from liability,
because they do not understand that the social characteristics of an
employee who appears odd may be symptoms of a covered impairment.
Yet this employee should be entitled to protection from discrimination
just as an employee of a more enlightened employer would be.
Protecting trait-based discrimination under the regarded as prong thus
creates proper incentives for employers to educate themselves about
impairments that affect social functioning, whereas failing to cover
trait-based discrimination has the opposite effect, contrary to the
purposes of the ADA.
Failing to protect trait-based discrimination under the regarded as
prong also makes regarded as cases very difficult for plaintiffs with
social impairments to prove. To do so, they would have to prove not
only that their employer discriminated against them on the basis of a
negatively perceived impairment, but also that the employer realized
that the traits to which it reacted negatively stemmed from a
recognized disability. This may often be impossible absent an
employer making "smoking gun" discriminatory comments that

be drawn from this deletion .... [The EEOC's] existing position, as expressed in its
policy guidance, court filings, and other regulatory and sub-regulatory documents,
remains unchanged.").
284 Merrill v. Burke E. Porter Mach. Co., 159 F. App'x 676, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2005);
see Case Law Developments, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 170, 291 (2006);
see also Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155. F.3d 799, 809 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
firing an employee who feels fatigue and lacks eye contact because of narcolepsy that
was not disclosed to the employer is not discriminatory).
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associate the impairment to which the employer reacted negatively to
a recognized disability. For example, it would not be enough for the
employer to say, "I am firing you because I'm annoyed by your
tendency towards significant mood changes"; the employer would
instead have to admit that, "I'm firing you because I think you have
bipolar disorder." But how often can employers be expected to make
such statements about suspected diagnoses? Even if they suspect an
underlying disorder, how often can employers be expected to admit
such suspicions when taking an adverse action against an employee
they disfavor because of an impairment-related trait?
If the regarded as prong is viewed as not covering trait-based
discrimination, the legal situation for persons with social impairments
under § 12102(1)(C) of Title I would be far more difficult than that
for persons with physical ones. In the latter category of cases, the very
physical symptom perceived -

for example, a limp -

is very often

the impairment itself. In the psychosocial context, in contrast, it may
be unclear whether a perceived symptom is related to an impairment
or is simply a personality attribute. Logically, however, it can be
convincingly argued that firing someone because he does not make
eye contact is equivalent to firing an employee because he has a limp.
In the first case, the employer is firing the employee for a perceived
social impairment, even if it does not know its cause, in the same way
that the employer violates the regarded as prong if it fires an employee
for a limp even if it does not know its cause. At bottom, it should be
enough that the employer perceived as a deficiency a trait unrelated to
a job's essential functions and took an adverse action on the basis of
this trait.285 Otherwise, persons with social impairments, as opposed to

-

obvious physical ones, risk losing the protection against
discrimination that may be the most appropriate for their situation
namely, protection against being regarded as different and treated
negatively as a result when they are perfectly capable of performing
their jobs.
Not permitting a cause of action under the regarded as prong based
on trait-based discrimination may have perverse incentive effects
under the ADA in yet another way as well. If an employee can only
gain protection under the regarded as prong by notifying her employer
that she has a non-apparent disability, she will be required to reveal
285 Cf. Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 814 F.3d 581, 588 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that
under the new ADAAA standards for regarded as claims, the plaintiff "need plead and
prove only that the defendants regarded her as having a physical or mental
impairment, no matter the defendants' view of the magnitude of the effect of the
perceived impairment").
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her diagnosis in order to gain protection. This will be necessary even
though revealing a non-obvious impairment may increase the chances
of discrimination against her. 286 As commentators have noted, one of
the most promising aspects of the underutilized regarded as prong of
the ADA is that it should protect employees from discrimination when
they have no need to request accommodations. 287 Requiring disclosure
of non-obvious impairments that need no accommodations in order to
be protected against discrimination defeats this important goal of the
regarded as prong, namely, to protect persons from disability
discrimination when they are not asking for accommodations. A
narrow interpretation of the regarded as prong, which requires
employees to disclose a specific diagnosis in order to be protected
from discrimination, thus perversely creates the conditions for more
rather than less disability discrimination, a goal Title I certainly does
not embrace.
In short, there are many reasons why the law under the ADA's
regarded as prong should be interpreted as not requiring an employee
to prove that an employer regarded her as having a specific disability.
Precisely because social impairment is not well understood, the
employee may have great difficulty proving that an employer regarded
her as having a particular condition unless she has previously
informed her employer that she has such a diagnosis. But it is a risky
step to inform an employer that one has a diagnosed condition to
which stigma attaches, especially when one needs no accommodations
other than refraining from discrimination. Volunteering such
information about a hidden disability increases the likelihood of
stigma and discrimination, which then may be difficult to prove. The
employee would thus confront yet another ADA Catch-22, either
disclosing and risking a higher probability of discrimination, or not
disclosing and risking no protection against discrimination on the
basis of attributes associated with a stigmatizing impairment. Here, as
in many other issues that arise in the social impairments context, early
and good legal counseling is crucially important, though far too often
not received.

286 See, e.g., Alina Tugend, Deciding Whether to Disclose Mental Disorders to the
Boss, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/your-money/
disclosing-mental-disorders-at-work.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcoreiphone-share& r=1#story-continues-1 (discussing the widespread difficulties that
employees with mental, behavioral, and emotional disorders face in deciding whether,
when, and to what extent to reveal their conditions to their employers).
287 See, e.g., Barry, supra note 278, at 238-42; Travis, Part and Parcel, supra note
277, at 61.
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In sum, for all the reasons just discussed, the better answer to the
question whether § 12101(1)(C) protects persons with impairments
from trait-based discrimination should be affirmative. The main
problem with the argument that attribute-based discrimination is
prohibited under the regarded as prong of Title I of the ADA is that it
does not offer a ready limiting principle. Professor Kevin Barry has
even argued that the regarded as prong offers "universal coverage" to
all persons, in much the same way that antidiscrimination statutes
cover all persons from race discrimination regardless of what race they
are perceived to be. 288 This argument is all to the good if courts would
accept it, but the lack of a limiting principle may cause them to balk.
Congress initially stated in the ADA that the statute covered
approximately 43 million people with disabilities, but then removed
this language in the ADAAA; 289 it is not clear, however, that in doing
so Congress intended to cover all persons within the reach of U.S. law.
Grappling with such a limiting principle would take this Article too far
afield from its central focus, but one can hope that creative scholars
will follow in the footsteps of Professors Travis and Barry's important
work to further analyze this and other issues the regarded as prong
presents.
CONCLUSION

The ADA states that it covers all types of disabilities, but the law still
has a long way to go in handling social impairments. Like all
disabilities, those that include elements of social impairment require
proper ADA analysis. Some degree of ability to interact with others is
relevant to most jobs, but many persons with some degree of
impairment in social functioning can do the essential functions of
many jobs, and may, indeed, be brilliant at those jobs. The ADA
teaches that respecting and accommodating differences in abilities
leads to a better world in a broad range of ways. It defines no limit
excluding social impairments from its coverage, and courts developing
ADA law should not do so either. Lawyers in the trenches, counseling
in and handling social impairment cases, must push the law forward in
the right directions, and this Article aims to help in that important
endeavor.

288 See Barry, supra note 278, at 217-18, 266.
289 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553,
3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).

